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The Immigrant City 
Rick Su*
Jurists, policymakers, and legal scholars often do not consider the issue of immigration from a 
local perspective.  As such, the intersection between immigration and local government law has 
largely been neglected in the legal academic literature.  Instead of subscribing to the 
conventional belief that immigration and local governments are doctrinally distinct, this article 
uncovers their latent intersection, explore how competing but often unexamined concerns about 
local governments in legal doctrine conceal the mutual impact that immigration and local 
government laws have upon one another, and use this analysis to explore how legal rules can be 
changed to enhance the positive roles that local governments can play in our national 
immigration project.  If we tend to consider the issue of immigration from a purely federal 
perspective, it is not solely because immigration implicates national interests that require the 
institutional judgment of the federal government.  Indeed, underlying the presumption of federal 
exclusivity are also three competing models of the immigrant city that correspond with often 
unexamined fears regarding the relationship between local governments and their immigrant 
populations.  Highlighting these concerns not only leads to a more nuanced understanding of 
what underlies our bias against local participation with regard to immigration, but also allows 
us to imagine alternative distribution of powers and responsibilities between federal and local 
governments.  I argue that by changing the incentive structure created by the legal rules 
governing local governments, we can begin to reimagine our immigrant cities as being a 
contribution rather than an obstacle to the substantive goals of our immigration project.   
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We do not typically think about immigration from a local perspective, although we inevitably 
rely on our personal experiences with the local impacts of immigration to formulate our position 
in the national discourse.  We also do not ordinarily conceive of local governments as having a 
role in immigration, although the prospects of our immigration policies often depend on how we 
organize the cities and towns in which immigrants settle.  For the most part, the doctrinal 
analysis of both immigration and local government law has ascribed to the belief that no two 
aspects of law can be more distinct from one another.  Indeed, the recent debates over the role of 
local governments in the enforcement of federal immigration laws highlight the widespread 
discomfort over the merging of these two legal frameworks: critics of local enforcement decry 
the adoption of a federal regulatory regime at the local level and its attendant costs on local 
communities, while proponents of enforcement denounce local resistance as an unacceptable 
intrusion of local prerogative into federal policy.1
If the doctrinal separation of immigration law and local government law is as entrenched as it is 
ordinarily assumed to be, then any intersection between these two bodies of law can only be 
understood as legal anomalies that should promptly be reconciled.  To be sure, legal scholars 
often do not recognize any connection between immigration and local government law at all.  
Those who have identified areas of overlap, however, largely tailor their analysis towards 
reifying the federalist division between what is local and what is national.  The argument that the 
site of this intersection may be a legal crossroad worthy of further research has thus far failed to 
be fully considered.   
 
This article attempts to offer such an analysis.  Instead of ascribing to the conventional belief that 
no connection exists between immigration and local government law, or employing legal 
analysis to expediently mask the interplay between the two, this article sets out to do the 
opposite.  It begins with the premise that a largely unnoticed but exceptionally important 
intersection already exists, argues that understanding this intersection exposes significant 
insights about how immigration and local government law organize the lives and experiences of 
immigrants and immigrant communities, and asserts that bringing this doctrinal intersection to 
light uncovers the possibility of developing alternative ways to resolve many of the ongoing 
debates in the immigration and local government discourse.  
 
I refer to the site of this intersection as the immigrant city.  In doing so, I am invoking not only 
the legal rules that organize the geographically identifiable places in which immigrants live, but 
also the legal doctrines that define the institutional role of our local governments and frame our 
conceptualization of “community” in an era of immigration.  Described as such, the immigrant 
city is largely absent in the legal academic literature.  Moreover, although judges and 
policymakers create many of the legal intersections that I wish to explore, they largely do so 
without a conscious or considered understanding of the immigrant cities they are creating.   
 
The failure of legal scholars, jurists, and policymakers to explicitly recognize or adequately 
explore the interplay between this nation’s immigration and local government laws is not just a 
 
1 Compare, e.g., Ellen Barry, City Vents Anger at Illegal Immigrants, L.A. Times, July 14, 2006, at 1, with Juan A. 
Lozano, Critics: Policy Makes Houston Haven for Immigrants, Houston Chron., July 31, 2006, a 1.   
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doctrinal oversight; it has considerable consequences for both our nation’s immigration project 
and the development of our local communities.  On the one hand, the doctrinal separation of 
these two fields conceals the fundamental impact that they have on one another.  Immigration 
scholars, who have thus far focused primarily on the desirability and consequences of our 
nation’s immigration policy, overlook the tremendous influence that the organization of our local 
spaces and the allocation of resources among communities have on this nation’s ability to 
integrate foreign immigrants and its capacity to channel the effects of immigration to the benefit 
of all its residents.  Similarly, local government scholars seeking to achieve a more efficient, 
equitable, and just allocation of municipal power and wealth neglect to account for the effect of 
immigration laws on the kind of communities we foster, the prospects for decentralized power, 
and workings of our local democratic institutions.  
 
On the other hand, the legal divide between immigration and local government law hides the 
extent to which this divergence is not only due to strong federal interest, but is also a byproduct 
of implicit and often unexamined fears about the relationship between immigrants and local 
communities.  In this article, I identify three stylized models of the immigrant city in legal 
doctrine: (1) the immigrant city as a threat to immigrants, (2) the immigrant city as a threat to the 
nation and the states, and (3) the immigrant city as a victim of immigrants and national 
immigration policy.  I use these models to highlight the degree to which immigration law 
influences and is influenced by the legal construction of the city, is based on concerns about 
decentralized power, and affects our understanding of the institutional role of local governments 
with respect to immigration.  More importantly, I argue that although these models arise out of 
competing concerns about the relationship between immigrants and cities, taken as a whole they 
all advance a disempowered and depoliticized vision of the city while perpetuating an image of 
immigrants as a federal population that is socially and politically outside of the local 
communities within which they reside.   
 
This article proceeds in four parts.  The first two parts examine how the immigrant city is 
currently represented.  Part I focuses on the profound social, economic, and political impact of 
immigration on the local level.  It describes the countless numbers of foreign “aliens” who now 
reside on our block as neighbors, work alongside us as colleagues, and may one day naturalize as 
fellow citizens.  In addition, it focuses on the local impacts that they have wrought — from the 
social, economic, and physical revitalization to the fiscal and cultural pressures (and sometimes 
vehement and violent backlashes).   
 
Part II reveals that notwithstanding the developments outlined in Part I, the legal academic 
literature has largely failed to recognize how immigration and local government law relate.  To 
be sure, there are extensive works in other academic disciplines looking at the condition of 
immigrants in, and the impact of immigration on, our local spaces.  Sociologists are studying the 
residential housing patterns of immigrants,2 their position in local social and economic 
networks,3 and their relationship with other racial and ethnic groups;4 economists are engaged in 
 
2 See, e.g., Dowell Myers & Cathy Yang Liu, The Emerging Dominance of Immigrants in the US Housing Market 
1970–2000, 23 Urban Policy and Research 347 (2005); Dowell Myers & Seong Woo Lee, Immigrant Trajectories 
into Homeownership: A Temporal Analysis of Residential Assimilation, 32 Int’l Migration Rev. 593 (1998).   
3 See, e.g., Roger Waldinger & Claudia Der-Martirosian, The Immigrant Niche: Pervasive, Persistant, Diverse, in
Strangers at the Gates : New Immigrants in Urban America (Roger Waldinger ed., 2001); Thomas Bailey & 
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a vigorous debate over the role immigrants play in regional economies5 and their impact on the 
fiscal health of local governments6; and urban theorists are exploring the fractured “translocal” 
identities7 that have arisen in “world” and “global cities” as a result of transnational flows of 
capital, culture, and people.8 Absent from this literature, however, is a rigorous examination of 
the role that legal rules play in creating or perpetuating these developments.  In short, scholars 
who are studying immigrants and cities do not see the law, while scholars focused on the law 
have demonstrated little awareness of the immigrant city.   
 
In response to the gap identified in Part II, Part III analyzes various legal and political 
developments in immigration and local government law to develop an analytical framework of 
the immigrant city as a legal concept.  I argue that underneath the presumption of federal 
exclusivity with regard to immigration lies an undercurrent of fear about the relationship 
between immigrants and local communities.  Expanding upon the conventional federal account 
of the doctrinal divergence between immigration and local government law, I will demonstrate 
how various legal developments at the national, state, and local level support three models of the 
immigrant city, each of which corresponds with different concerns about local involvement on 
the issue of immigration.  These three models, I contend, play a significant role in structuring 
how we conceive of immigrants and the city in the national and local debates.   
 
Part IV asks whether the immigrant city can be reimagined in a different light.  It does so by 
tackling the implicit concerns about the relationship between immigrants and local communities 
discussed in Part III.  If these concerns perpetuate the impression that local governments are ill-
suited to participate in the immigration project, then readjusting the legal rules to alleviate these 
concerns might increase our acceptance of local involvement — especially with regard to 
immigration issues that the federal government is currently unable or unwilling to address.  The 
choice, however, is not between local impotence and local autonomy; rather, depending on the 
substantive goals we wish to pursue, cities can selectively empowered, disempowered, and 
incentivized to play a meaningful role in the immigration project.  To foreground the immigrant 
city, therefore, is to bring these possibilities to light.  Part IV will be followed by a brief 
conclusion.        
 
I hope in this article to expose the legal doctrinal influence of immigration and local government 
law on our current understanding of the immigrant city and open the door for alternative 
conceptualizations.  Although this article may be one of the first to address this specific topic, it 
is not intended to be the last.  Indeed, I hope to motivate others in the legal academy to engage in 
 
Roger Waldinger, Primary, Secondary, and Enclave Labor Markets : A Training Systems Approach, 56 American 
Sociological Review 432 (1991).  
4 See generally Prismatic Metropolis: Inequality in Los Angeles (Lawrence D. Bobo et al. eds., 2000); Nelson 
Lim, On the Back of Blacks?: Immigrants and the Fortunes of African Americans, in Strangers at the Gates, supra
note 3, at 186. 
5 Compare George J. Borjas, Heaven’s Gate (1999), with Julian L Simon, The Economic Consequences of 
Immigration (2d ed. 1999) and David Card, Is the New Immigration Really So Bad?, 115 The Econ. J. F300 
(2005). 
6 See Debroah L. Garvey et al., Are Immigrants a Drain on the Public Fisc?: State and Local Impacts in New Jersey,
Soc. Sci. Q. 537 (2002).  
7 See e.g., Michael Peter Smith, Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization 169 - 72 (2000) 
8 See generally John Friedmann, The World City Hypothesis (1986); Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New 
York, London, Tokyo (1991). 
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a considered and conscious discussion of this issue as well.  The immigrant city is far too 
important an institution to be left on the sidelines of our immigration and local government 
debates.  The time has come for us to take a serious look at its legal structure and its effects on 
American society.   
I. The Local Impact of Immigration  
 
The history of the American city is intimately related to the history of immigration.  Just as 
America is often described as a country of immigrants, it follows that America can also be 
described as a country of immigrant cities.  Since the beginning of America’s urbanization, 
almost all of the major metropolitan regions that now serve as this country’s economic and 
cultural foundation have been built upon the ready supply of immigrant labor and molded by the 
social fabric of immigrant communities.  Therefore, in order to understand the legal significance 
of the immigrant city, we must therefore begin with an analysis of the ways in which 
immigration is changing the demographic, economic, and political character of our local 
communities.   
A. Demographics 
 
We are now experiencing America’s second great wave of immigration.  Not since the turn of 
the 20th century has a larger percentage of immigrants relative to the native population landed on 
America’s shores and poured into its cities.  In contrast to the 500,000 or so immigrants who 
arrived in the 1930s, more than 9 million immigrants came between 1991 and 2000.  At 11.7 
percent of the U.S. population in 2003,9 the foreign-born population of over 31 million is slowly 
approaching the 14.8 percent peak set in the 1890s.10 
These statistics are telling.  But they fail to capture “one central feature of the immigration 
process: immigrants are geographically concentrated in their host countries.”11 In other words, 
the aggregate national statistics that dominate much of the immigration debate do not always 
reflect the actual living conditions of immigrants or the specific manner in which they interact 
with American society.   
 
Indeed, not unlike historic patterns of immigrant settlement, almost all immigrants today live in 
established metropolitan regions rather than the rural fringe.12 Moreover, immigrants are not 
evenly distributed.  Currently, five metropolitan regions (Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco 
Chicago, and Miami) are home to more than half of America’s foreign born-population.13 This 
concentration has radically transformed the demographic make-up of these areas.  For example, 
immigrants and their children constitute almost two-thirds of Miami’s, “more than half of 
 
9 U.S. Census Bureau, The Foreign-Born Population in the United States, at 1 (August 2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-551.pdf. 
10 Campbell J. Gibson & Kay Jung, U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born 
Population of the United States: 1850 to 2000, at 1 (2006), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0081/twps0081.pdf. 
11 Jeannette Money, Fences and Neighbors: The Political Geography of Immigration Control 43 (1999).  
12 See The Foreign-Born Population in the United States, supra note 9, at 2.   
13 See Roger Waldinger & Jennifer Lee, New Immigrant in Urban America, in Strangers at the Gate, supra note 3, 
at 30, 43. 
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metropolitan Los Angeles’s . . ., just under half of metro San Francisco’s . . . , and two fifths of 
metropolitan New York’s” total population.14 
In addition to these cities, new immigrant “gateways” are also beginning to take shape.15 Indeed, 
for the last few decades, immigrants have been leaving or bypassing traditional gateways for 
non-traditional destinations.16 From 1980 to 2000, the metropolitan regions of Atlanta, Raleigh, 
and Las Vegas experienced some of the largest percentage increases of foreign-born residents in 
the entire country — 817%, 709%, and 637%, respectively.17 Immigrants are also increasingly 
moving to the suburbs: at the turn of the twenty-first century, the percentage of immigrants living 
in the suburbs surpassed those living in the central cities.18 
Because of the racial and ethnic diversity of the most recent wave of immigration, this process 
has dramatically altered the demographic composition of various communities.  For instance, the 
Los Angeles suburb of Compton — engrained in our collective cultural imagination as a 
quintessential black “ghetto” — has in recent years, and with substantial controversy, become a 
majority-Hispanic city.19 In addition, Los Angeles County, which was overwhelmingly Anglo in 
the 1970s (70%),20 has since become a majority-minority region with Anglos accounting for less 
than 30% of the county’s residents.21 As a result, the traditional image of white suburbs ringing 
an urban core of racial and ethnic minorities has been replaced by “islands” of Anglo enclaves 
“surrounded by vast ethnic or transitional communities.”22 
B. Municipal Health 
 
How has immigration affected the local communities in which they reside?  For most 
communities, particularly major metropolitan centers, the effect has been positive.  Indeed, many 
now believe that urban revitalization of the latter half of the twentieth century is due in large part 
to the liberalization of the federal immigration restrictions in 1965.  As Paul Grogan and Tony 
Proscio explained, “[t]here is almost no question, in any case, about whether immigration is good 
for cities, or about whether many inner-city markets will reach their full potential without it.”23 
14 John Mollenkopf, et al., Immigrant Political Participation in New York and Los Angeles, in Governing 
American Cities 17, 19 (Michael Jones-Correa ed., 2001).   
15 See U.S. Census Bureau, Migration of Natives and the Foreign Born: 1995 to 2000, at 4 (August 2003), available 
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-11.pdf.  
16 See id. at 4 – 9; see also William Frey, Diversity Spreads Out: Metropolitan Shifts in Hispanic, Asian, and Black 
Populations Since 2000, Living Cities Census Series (Brookings Institution), Mar. 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.brook.edu/metro/pubs/20060307_Frey.pdf.  
17 See Audrey Singer, The Rise of New Immigrant Gateways, Living Cities Census Series (Brookings 
Institution), Feb. 2004, at 21, available at http://www.brookings.edu/urban/pubs/20040301_gateways.pdf. 
18 See id. at 10.   
19 See generally Albert M. Camarillo, Black and Brown in Compton: Demographic Change and Ethnic/Race 
Relations in a South Central Los Angeles Community, 1950-2000, in Not Just Black and White (Nancy Foner et 
al. eds., 2004). 
20 See Edward W. Soja, Introduction to Los Angeles, in The City: Los Angeles and Urban Theory at the End of 
the Twentieth Century 14 (Allen J. Scott et al. eds., 1996) 
21 U.S. Census Bureau, State and County QuickFacts for Los Angeles County, at 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06037.html 
22 Dale Maharidge, The Coming White Minority 10 (1996). 
23 Paul S. Grogan & Tony Proscio, Comeback Cities: A Blueprint for Urban Neighborhood Revival 139 
(2000). 
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Echoing this sentiment, Thomas Muller deemed it “safe to say . . . that immigration by itself has 
sparked more neighborhood revitalization and commercial activity than even the most successful 
case of government intervention . . .  Had immigration to central cities been a federal urban aid 
program, it would be rated among the most successful and cost-effective approaches for 
invigorating the urban core.”24 
To explain these positive effects, commentators have noted how immigrants fill various 
economic gaps and gravitate toward self-employment and entrepreneurship.25 Studies show that 
various niches in urban economies, from low-skilled labor such as those in the garment 
industry26 to high-skilled occupations in urban hospitals,27 are disproportionately staffed by 
immigrants.  Moreover, the human and social capital of foreign immigrants has helped many 
cities become critical nodes in the global exchange of capital, culture, and information —what 
urban scholars now refer to as “World” or “Global Cities.”  Indeed, it is no coincidence that the 
City of Miami, which supports a large immigrant population from Central and South America, 
has emerged in recent years as America’s gateway to Latin America28 in the same way that Los 
Angeles is now widely seen as the gateway to the Pacific Rim.29 
It is worth noting, however, that much of the positive local impact of immigration is due to their 
presence.  The drastic decline of many urban cores and inner-ring suburbs during the mid-1900s 
was caused in large part by massive suburbanization and urban depopulation.  This, in turn, led 
to a decline in the value of residential property and a corresponding fall in the municipal tax 
base.  As a result, many residential and commercial properties were abandoned, while the 
declining tax base forced cities to raise taxes and lower the level and quality of municipal 
services.  The inflow of immigrants in the 1970s and 1980s played a large role in stemming and, 
in some cities, reversing this decline.30 Anecdotes abound of neighborhoods that have gone from 
being blocks of abandoned buildings to those supporting vibrant immigrant communities.31 
Moreover, a study conducted during the 1990s found that on almost all economic and social 
indicators of municipal health — population growth, job creation, unemployment, per capita 
income, poverty, crime, and tax rate — “cities with large foreign-born populations fare better 
than cities with few immigrants.”32 
24 Thomas Muller, Immigrants and the American City 304 (1993).   
25 See generally Roger Walding, et al., Ethnic Entrepreneurs: Immigrant Businesses in Industrial Societies 
(1990). 
26 See Ivan Light et al., Immigration Incorporation in the Garment Industry of Los Angeles, 33 Int’l Migration Rev. 
5, 12 – 13 (1999).   
27 See Loius Winnick, New People in Old Neighborhoods 42 (1990); Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal 
Aliens and the Making of Modern America 262 (2003).  
28 See Jan Nijman, Globalization to a Latin Beat: The Miami Growth Machine, 551 The Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & 
Soc. Sci. 164, 166 – 67 (1997); Saskia Sassesn & Alejadro Portes, Miami: A New Global City?, 22 Contemp. Soc. 
471, 472 - 72 (1993). 
29 See Franklin J. James, et al., The Effect of Immigration on Urban Communities, 3 Cityscape 171, 182 – 83 
(1998). 
30 See Muller, supra note 24, at 116 – 17; Winnick, supra note 27, at 11.   
31 See, e.g., Joel Millman, The Other Americans 80 (1997); Robert L. Smith, Chinese Immigrants Reshape 
Neighborhood in Growing Numbers, Families Build a Community in Cleveland, The Plain Dealer, July 23, 2001, 
at A1.   
32 Stephen Moore, Hoover Institute, Immigration and the Rise and Decline of American Cities 29 (1997).  The 
report was careful to note the data “does not prove that immigrants cause cities’ economic prosperity,” but simply 
“challenges the conventional belief that immigration is a leading cause of urban decline.”  Id. at 4. 
Draft: September 4, 2006 
 
9
If immigration has helped to revitalize struggling, depopulated communities, the research on its 
fiscal costs to local government presents a more complicated story.  The conventional belief is 
that although immigrants pay more in taxes to the federal government than they receive in 
federally-funded services, on average, they cost local governments more than they contribute to 
local coffers.33 Of course, these findings should be understood in context.  First, it is generally 
agreed that immigrants do not pose a higher burden on local services or pay fewer taxes than 
similarly-situated native residents.34 Second, most municipal services are consumed collectively; 
even if local tax revenues collected from immigrants do not completely defray the cost of these 
services, often the economic burden borne by local governments would not be reduced 
proportionately if fewer immigrants were to arrive.35 Moreover, studies on the tax burden of 
immigrants on local governments often fail to account for the fact that very few cities actually 
cover all their expenditures with local tax receipts; a large part of most urban municipal budgets, 
regardless of the size of their immigrant population, is made up of state and federal grants.36 
C. Local Reactions 
 
Municipal issues over which local governments have traditionally exercised the most control — 
education, policing, the provision of local services, and spatial planning and zoning — are now 
being complicated by the unique needs and differing interests of immigrants and immigrant 
communities.  How have local governments reacted to these changes? 
 
So far, it appears that most local government officials are not proactively addressing these issues.  
A recent study on local governments in California found that, with the exception of cities 
characterized by exceptionally large immigrant populations and a strong presence of immigrant-
advocacy groups, communications between immigrants and local governments are usually quite 
limited.37 Most local government officials in cities with significant and/or growing immigrant 
populations ranked immigrants and ethnic organizations near the bottom of their list with regard 
to their influence on local policies, especially with regard to housing.38 Ironically, although 
immigrants generally express a lack of trust for local police, local police officials demonstrated 
 
33 One literature review found that on average immigrant household costs local governments $1,638 in services and 
generates only $1,172 in revenues.  See James, et al, supra note 29, at 185. 
34 See, e.g., Michael Fix & Jeffrey Passel, Urban Institute, Trends in Noncitizens’ and Citizens’ Use of Public 
Benefits Following Welfare Reform: 1994-97 (March 1999) (finding that when controlling for poverty and/or the 
presence of children, welfare use among noncitizens were lower than citizens before and significantly more so after 
the 1996 welfare reforms); Sarita A. Mohanty, Unequal Access: Immigrants and U.S. Health Care, Immigration 
Pol’y in Focus, July 2006, at 1, 3 – 4 (finding that per capita health care expenditures were 55% lower for 
immigrants than natives in 1998 (including emergency room visits paid for by local governments) and that on 
average immigrant children receive 77% less than native children), available at
http://www.ailf.org/ipc/infocus/unequal_access.pdf.  But see Borjas, supra note 5, at 113 (arguing that it matters not 
that “immigrant households headed by high school dropouts do not use welfare any more often than native 
households headed by high school dropouts — especially if high school dropouts dominate the immigrant 
population.”).   
35 See James et al., supra note 29, at 184. 
36 See, e.g., Michael Jones-Correa, Structural Shifts and Institutional Capacity: Possibilities for Ethnic Cooperation 
and Conflict in Urban Settings, in Governing American Cities, supra note 14, at 183, 191 – 194.   
37 S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Paul G. Lewis, Public Policy Institute of California, Immigrants and Local 
Governance: The View from City Hall 33 – 34, 37 - 38 (2005)  
38 See id. at 49. 
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the highest awareness of immigrant needs and expressed the strongest interest in reaching out to 
establish tangible relationships with their communities.39 
This is not to say that some localities, especially suburban communities with little experience 
dealing with immigrants, have not reacted passionately to growing influx of immigrants.  There 
are numerous accounts of community agitation with local immigrant populations — often 
focusing on the most visible aspects such as day-laborers and residential overcrowding.  In doing 
so, local communities are increasingly trying to extend their control into the private sphere40 
while seeking to close off and regulate traditionally public spaces as well.41 
II. The Immigrant and the City in Contemporary Legal Scholarship 
 
But if immigration has and continues to be a significant influence on the development of our 
local communities, both immigration and local government scholars have largely ignored the 
connection.  In the cities described by local government scholars, one would be hard-pressed to 
find any signs of immigrants.  Of the immigrants described by immigration law scholars, one 
would assume that they had no relationship with any governmental institution other than the 
nation-state.   
 
To be sure, neither the “immigrant” nor the “city” is entirely absent from the local government or 
immigration law literature respectively.  As this Part shows, local government scholars do 
sometimes acknowledge immigrants just as immigration scholars occasionally note cities.  The 
focus of this article, however, is not just the immigrant or the city as descriptive labels, but also 
the immigrant and the city as legal concepts.  From this perspective, the gap is even more 
glaring.  It is not simply that the immigrant and the city are not discussed together in a 
comprehensive manner.  Rather, the manner in which they are represented in the literature often 
obscures the connection between the two from a legal perspective.   
 
This Part explores how academic accounts offer an incomplete picture of the legal role of the 
immigrant city in both local government and immigration law.  So far, the representation of the 
immigrant in the local government literature focuses predominately on the racial, ethnic, or 
socioeconomic characteristics of immigrants or their preference for specific local services.  In 
doing so, the local government literature has largely ignored the fact that the immigrant identity, 
and the rights, obligations, and societal roles that flow from that identity, is structured and 
constructed by the federal laws concerning immigration and naturalization.  At the same time, 
the immigration literature recognizes the city as a geographic place within which immigrants 
concentrate and a governmental entity that provides public services to immigrants.  But in both 
of these portrayals, the city is either represented as an institution that is synonymous with the 
 
39 See id. at 75 – 76. 
40 See Stephanie McCrummen, Manassas Changes Definition Of Family: Activists Criticize New Housing Limits As 
Anti-Immigrant, Wash. Post, Dec. 28, 2005, at A1.  This local ordinance was later repeated.  See Stephanie 
McCrummen, Anti-Crowding Law Repealed: Latinos Were Focus of Manassas Ban on Extended Families in 
Homes, Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 2006, at A1. 
41 See Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angles v. Burke, No. CV 98-4863-GHK, 2000 WL 1481467, 
at *1, *13 (C.D.Cal. Sept. 12, 2000) (striking down a Los Angeles County Ordinance that prohibited day-laborers 
from soliciting work on the street for violating the First and Fourteenth Amendment). 
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state and therefore lacking an independent legal status, or simply a geographic space without a 
legal or political identity at all.  I argue that the tendency of immigration and local government 
scholars to rely on legally-neutral categories explains why the legal construction of the 
immigrant city has largely gone unnoticed.   
A. The Immigrant in Local Government Law 
1. The Immigrant as Racial, Ethnic, or Socioeconomic Minorities  
 
America’s metropolitan regions are “now divided into districts that are so different from each 
other they seem to be different worlds”42 Thus, a central aim of local government scholars has 
been to excavate and explain the extent to which local government laws create and maintain such 
divisions.  Eschewing the conventional belief that the structure of our local communities can be 
wholly explained by individual preferences or neutral market dynamics, local government 
scholars have focused on how legal rules empower certain communities and skew market 
incentives to favor racial and socioeconomic segregation.  It is no surprise then that this focus 
serves as one of the primary frameworks for discussing immigrants in the local government 
context:  local government scholars often invoke immigrants as, and therefore interchangeable 
with, racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic minorities.   
 
For some scholars, this manner of discussing immigrants is rooted in history.  Immigrants are 
often described in the local government literature as undesirable populations in the inner cities 
from which well-to-do residents sought escape through suburbanization.  Therefore, for scholars 
like Professor Briffault, the influx of poor immigrants into the urban core, their ability to secure 
political power therein, and the association of the city with “foreigners, crime, vice and political 
corruption,” explains the reason why the “older stock of Americans living in the outlying areas” 
began to resist annexation in favor of maintaining political autonomy.43 Representing 
immigrants in this manner, Briffault quickly incorporates his brief discussion of immigrants into 
the broader and more conventional analysis of the role of local government law in perpetuating 
racial and ethnic segregation.44 At the same time, the racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic account 
of immigrants is used to explain the contemporary organization of our metropolitan regions as 
well.  For example, in describing the portrayal of Los Angeles as “Capital of the Third World,” 
Professor Frug’s focus was not so much on immigrants per se, but on how it “symboliz[es]” the 
fact that “issues of ethnicity, race, and class cross-cut America's metropolitan areas without 
stopping at jurisdictional borders.”45 
To be sure, race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status are important components of the 
immigration debate.  The problem with this representation, however, is that immigrants are 
legally burdened in ways that most racial and socioeconomic minorities are not.  Unlike native 
minorities, the marginalization of immigrants is ideologically and legally supported by the fact 
that they are construed by the law as outside of our political community.  Indeed, not only do our 
immigration and naturalization laws permit discrimination in ways that would not be acceptable 
 
42 Gerald E. Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1047, 1047 (1996). 
43 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II — Localism and Legal Theory, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 346, 364 (1990). 
44 See id. at 364 – 65.  
45 Gerald E. Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 253, 318 (1993).  
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for American citizens, but the powerful rationale that supports this legal position justifies their 
marginality in social and economic contexts as well. 
2. The Immigrant as a Proxy for Market Preferences 
 
The second approach of local government scholars is to account for immigrant status as a proxy 
for a particular set of preferences for municipal services or community character.  Instead of 
focusing on the reactions of natives to immigrants, this account focuses on the type of 
communities that they prefer.   
 
The work of Professor Gillette is an example of this approach.  He touches upon the issue of 
immigration by identifying how immigrants may possess a set of preferences different from 
those of native residents, which in turn affects how a community may seek to structure their 
services in order to either attract or deter them.  He notes that even if a locality would stand to 
benefit from an influx of immigrants into the region, it may be inclined to free ride by not 
providing immigrant services and imposing those costs upon other communities, if any, that do.46 
To be sure, Gillette employs this model as an example of how background legal rules affect the 
willingness of localities to undertake or subsidize activities to the benefit of themselves and the 
region.  Nevertheless, the understanding of immigrants underlying this account focuses primarily 
on immigrant status as a proxy for certain set of preferences.   
 
Accounting for immigrants in this manner conforms to two broad generalizations about the 
relationship between immigrants and local communities.  The first is that the residential choice 
of immigrants is predominately guided by their preferences.  Thus immigrant communities are 
portrayed as alternative economic and social marketplaces within which immigrants have 
opportunities for upward mobility in similar ways as natives in the mainstream economy.47 This 
view leads naturally to another commonly held belief in the local government literature: that 
local communities can be understood as a package of goods and services that potential residents 
select, much like a consumer would in a traditional marketplace.  Corresponding with Tiebout’s 
market conceptualization of local communities, immigrant communities are perceived as another 
example of a voluntary association established by the rational and efficient workings of the 
marketplace of communities.48 
Again, this account explains much of the local dynamics that produce immigrant communities.  
Nevertheless, focusing too much on the immigrant communities as a product of rational choice 
obscures the manner by which these communities, or at least the incentive structure that leads 
immigrants to favor them, is influenced by background legal rules.  It ignores the fact, as Robert 
Park noted at the turn of the twentieth century, “that if the immigrant lives in a colony of his own 
people it is because, under ordinary circumstances, that is the only place he can live at all”;49 or 
 
46 Clayton P. Gillette, The Conditions of Interlocal Cooperation, 21 J. L. & Pol. 365, 386 - 87 (2005).   
47 See, e.g., Richard Alba & Victor Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and 
Contemporary Immigration 164 (2003); Kenneth L. Wilson & Alejadro Portes, Immigrant Enclaves: An Analysis 
of the Labor Market Conditions of Cubans in Miami, 86 American J. of Sociology 295, 315 (1980).   
48 Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416, 418 - 20 (1956); see also Gerald E. 
Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 23, 26 – 28 (1998) (describing the prevalence of Tiebout’s argument in the 
local government literature).   
49 Robert E. Park, The Collected Papers of Robert Ezra Park __ (1974). 
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as Professors Frug and Barron recently noted, immigrant preferences are necessarily confined by 
the type of communities that the existing local government structure encourages and permits.50 
Moreover, as social scientists have discovered, although immigrant communities provide 
benefits to recent immigrants, they can also have a restrictive dark side.  There is a growing 
awareness that the cultural and economic niches that these communities produce also work as 
socioeconomic traps for many of its members.51 
In addition, the market-actor view of immigrants and immigrant communities neglects the fact 
that immigration laws also play a role in encouraging or perpetuating enclave development.  
Immigration law’s family reunification policy and financial sponsorship requirement encourage 
concentrated living patterns in which the enforced legal dependency is easier to satisfy.  It also 
strengthens the reliance of immigrants on enclave labor markets.  Because most employers in the 
mainstream labor market, especially those in the low-wage sectors, are unwilling to provide the 
support or assurances required for the sponsorship of new immigrants, existing immigrants can 
often only rely on co-ethnic employers in the enclave labor market for such needs, which further 
strengthens the hold of ethnic employers on immigrant laborers.52 
3. The Normative Outlook of Local Government Law 
 
It may be that the local government literature’s failure to treat the immigrant as a legal concept is 
largely a result of the doctrinal divergence between immigration and local government law.  
However, it may also be that addressing immigrants from a non-legal perspective serves to 
preserve the normative framework that dominates much of the local government literature — one 
that focuses on the commonality of citizenship in advancing reform.   
 
Most local government scholars start from the position that the current structure of local 
government law perpetuates troubling inter-local inequities and undesirable residential 
segregation.  Underlying this conviction is the belief that notwithstanding the significant role that 
local boundaries play in dividing the residents of the metropolitan landscape, a meta-framework 
exists through which one can make an appeal to mutual obligation.  It is therefore no surprise 
that most of the solutions that are proposed in the local government literature rest upon the 
assumption that a broader communal identity exists to bind the fates of all residents together.  In 
their attempt to buttress their normative project, local government scholars often invoke the idea 
of “citizenship” (presumably national or state) in order to draw upon the mutual obligations that 
residents of different communities have toward one another in order to challenge the inequities 
that municipal boundaries often serve to perpetuate.53 Indeed, if no such overarching framework 
exists to capture the legal and political interconnection between residents of one municipality to 
 
50 David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, The Census as a Call to Action, 29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1387, 1390 (2002).   
51 For example, Professor Kwong observes that the ethnic solidarity in New York’s Chinese community “has 
increasingly been manufactured by the economic elite,” most of whom do not live in the community itself, “to gain 
better control over their co-ethnic employees.”  Peter Kwong, Manufacturing Ethnicity, 17 Critique of 
Anthropology 365, 366 (1997).   
52 See Peter Kwong, Ethnic Subcontracting as an Impediment to Interethnic Coalitions: The Chinese Experience, in
Governing American Cities, supra note 14, at 71, 78.   
53 See Kenneth Karst, Belonging to America 185 (1989) (arguing that with respect to racial desegregation, “[t]he 
community immediately in view was the local community, but the claim to participate in that community’s public 
life as an equal member was a claim founded on a national ideal and a body of national law.”). 
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another, many of the redistributive prescriptions local government scholars propose would lack 
much of their normative force.54 
Take, for example, the reformative proposals of Professor Schragger.  Like many local 
government scholars, Schragger deconstructs the concept of “community” by revealing the 
extent to which it is constructed by exclusionary and boundary-maintaining norms.  Seeking an 
alternative, Schragger finds guidance in Saenz v. Roe,55 a Supreme Court decision striking down 
a California statute limiting the welfare benefits of new residents who had just moved from 
another state.56 
Schragger’s invocation of Saenz is fitting in the local government context because the Supreme 
Court’s commitment to inter-state mobility in this case contrasts sharply with its tolerance of 
barriers to inter-municipal mobility in cases like Warth v. Seldon. As Schragger aptly notes, 
“[w]hat is quite stunning [about Saenz] is the radical disjuncture between Saenz's rigorous attack 
on a statute that would make it marginally less attractive for poor residents from other states to 
move to California and Warth's equally rigorous defense of an exclusionary zoning regime that 
makes it virtually impossible for poor residents from a nearby town to move into [the wealthy 
community of] Penfield.”57 
Nevertheless, what makes the bold language in Saenz useful as a counterpoint to exclusionary 
zoning cases like Warth is its reliance on a strong communitarian conceptualization of 
citizenship through its invocation of the long-neglected Privileges and Immunities Clause.  
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens explained that such a right to inter-state mobility “is 
protected not only by the new arrival's status as a state citizen, but also by her status as a citizen 
of the United States”; it is the recognition that a “citizen of the United States has a perfect 
constitutional right to go to and reside in any State he chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, 
and an equality of rights with every other citizen; and the whole power of the nation is pledged to 
sustain him in that right.”58 
But if Saenz’s “construction of a national citizenship through the wholly unanticipated rebirth of 
the privileges or immunities clause” gives doctrinal support to challenges against exclusionary 
practices by suburban enclaves on the local level, it “also illustrates the perils of the citizenship 
project [by] appear[ing] to draw an indelible line between the rights of citizens and aliens.”59 
Immigrants, whose claim to any such overarching community are weakened by the fact that they 
are legally and morally understood to be outside of the national polity, threaten the normative 
thrust of most local government scholarship.  Indeed, it is almost uniformly assumed that our 
nation’s obligation to noncitizen immigrants is fundamentally different from those, minority or 
 
54 See David Miller, On Nationality 72 (1995) (“It is because we have prior obligations of nationality that includes 
obligations to provide for the needs of members that the practice of citizenship properly includes redistributive 
elements of the kind that we commonly find in contemporary states.”) 
55 526 U.S. 489 (1999) 
56 Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 371, 467 – 71 (2001).  
57 Schragger, supra note 56, at 468. 
58 526 U.S. at 502, 504. 
59 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Semblence of Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State, and American Citizenship 
70 – 71 (2002). 
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otherwise, who have formal membership in our national community.60 Thus, although 
mobilizing a strong conceptualization of citizenship offers ways to dismantle the pervasive local 
insularity that has contributed to the vast disparity between prosperous and disadvantaged local 
jurisdictions, it also poses the risk of excluding noncitizen immigrants from the progressive 
project.   
B. The City in Immigration Law 
1. The Myth of Unimpeded Internal Migration 
 
Given the almost exclusive focus on the nation-state as the only relevant legal institution in the 
immigration discourse, it is no surprise that most accounts of the city treat it simply as a 
geographic place where immigrants live.  That cities are also political and legal entities often 
escapes notice.  Even more interesting, however, is the non-legal manner in which the city is 
portrayed in the normative theoretical debate over immigration restrictions.  Indeed, in this 
debate, the immigration literature has managed to create and perpetuate a puzzling myth: that in 
opposition to transnational migration, internal migration in liberal democratic nations such as the 
United States is largely unrestricted.   
 
Consider, for instance, the foundation of Michael Walzer’s theoretical justification for a nation-
state’s right to regulate transnational migration.61 Like other scholars who have wrestled with 
the concept of a national community,62 Walzer admits early on that “few of us have any direct 
experience of what a country is or what it means to be a member . . . we understand it best when 
we compare it to other, smaller associations whose compass we can more easily grasp,” such as 
the “neighborhood.”63 
Nevertheless, although Walzer invokes the neighborhood, his account largely overlooks consider 
the complex legal regime that regulates how neighborhoods are constructed and maintained.  As 
Walzer asserts, the neighborhood is a place without any formal admissions criteria and as such, 
can be understood as a “random association, ‘not a selection, but rather a specimen of life as a 
whole.’”64 To be fair, Walzer admits that while “strangers” cannot be formally admitted or 
excluded, they can be welcomed or not welcomed.  Moreover, he briefly notes the role of 
municipal zoning in maintaining class segregation.  Nevertheless, he posits that as a formal 
matter, neighborhoods are essentially open institutions that present no significant obstacle to 
inter-local mobility.65 
60 See Nathan Glazer, Conclusion, in Clamor at the Gates 311, 314 (Nathan Glazer ed. 1985) (expressing concern 
that “at some point it would seem immigration must affect the opportunities of earlier minorities with longer 
established and more legitimate claims on American polity”).   
61 Other immigration scholars have also invoked the myth of unimpeded internal migration as well.  See Joseph 
Carens, Aliens and Citizenship: the Case for Open Borders, in Theorizing Citizenship 229, 245 (Ronald Beiner ed., 
1994); Brian Barry, Quest for Consistency: A Sceptical View, in Free Movement 279, 284 (Brian Barry et al. eds., 
1992).   
62 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities 6 (2d ed. 1991) (arguing that the modern nation is best 
understood as an “imagined political community — and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”).   
63 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice 35 – 36 (1984).  
64 See id. at 37 
65 See id. at 36 - 37 
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Construing the neighborhood in this manner, Walzer’s defense of a state’s ability to restrict, 
control, and regulate immigration essentially becomes a defense of his vision of localism.  
Rejecting claims that unimpeded immigration limits the development of the “patriotic 
sentiments” that make communal cohesion possible, Walzer contends that open borders would 
actually lead to the opposite — an intense and undesirable surge in localist sentiment and 
regional fragmentation.  As he explains:   
 
Neighborhoods can be open only if countries are at least potentially closed.  Only if states 
make a selection among would-be members and guarantee the loyalty, security, and 
welfare of the individuals it selects, can local communities take shape as ‘indifferent’ 
associations determined solely by personal preference and market capacity. . . .  To tear 
down the walls of the state is not . . . to create a world without walls, but rather to create a 
thousand petty fortresses.66 
In this defense of localism, however, Walzer’s argument actually oscillates between two 
competing visions of local communities.  On the one hand, local communities are worth 
protecting because they are a legally unrestricted aggregation of strangers.  On the other hand, 
the fear that open borders on a national level will result in “a thousand petty fortresses” suggest 
that local communities are already empowered with the legal authority to exclude “undesirable” 
residents.  Yet the foundation for Walzer’s claim that neighborhoods are worth protecting is 
because they are not entitled to restrict entry through legal mechanisms.   
 
Walzer does not wrestle with the latent contradictions in his theoretical model.  Indeed, one can 
argue that through the use of particular labels, Walzer avoids this legal conflict altogether: he 
uses “neighborhood” — a geographic space that lacks any positive legal identity — when 
referring to what needs to be protected and only switches to talking about “cities” when 
discussing the dangers of internal fragmentation.67 Therefore, even while using local 
communities as an analytical model for understanding national immigration policy, Walzer and 
others in the normative immigration literature continue to reify the invisibility of the city as a 
legal concept by continuing to overlook the role that local government law plays in forming and 
organizing such communities.   
2. Immigration Federalism and the Conflation of State and Local Governments  
 
For some immigration scholars, there is the growing recognition that the “local” is more than just 
a geographic place.  Rather, under a broad field of inquiry known as “immigration federalism,” 
these scholars recognize that local communities are legal and political institutions and have 
begun to examine policies instituted by state and local government that affect the lives of 
immigrants.   
 
The legal inquiry into the role of state and local governments under the rubric of immigration 
federalism arose predominantly in response to two major legal developments, both of which 
occurred in 1996.  The first was the passage of the Welfare Reform Act, which rendered legal 
 
66 Id. at 38 – 39. 
67 See id. at 38. 
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immigrants without citizenship ineligible for several federal benefit programs68 and authorized 
the state to provide or deny state benefits to noncitizen immigrants.69 The second was the 
passage of the 1996 Immigration Reform Act, which authorized, but did not require, state and 
local governments to enter into cooperative arrangements with the federal government to enforce 
federal immigration laws70 while, at the same time, invalidating local government policies that 
prohibit employees from cooperating with federal immigration officials.71 
Because contemporary immigration scholars perceive the increasing role of state and local 
governments as a radical departure from traditional immigration jurisprudence, the articles in this 
field have predominately focused on the legality and desirability of devolving the federal 
government’s immigration powers.72 Nevertheless, although the recent scholarship on 
immigration federalism has pushed immigration scholars to consider state and local governments 
in immigration matters, these inquiries have yet to fully consider the body of local government 
law.   
 
Indeed, it appears that most immigration scholars continue to conflate state and local 
governments without acknowledging the unique role of local governments relative to the state.  
This is slightly surprising because one of the legal developments that prompted this course of 
inquiry — the 1996 reform to the Immigration Act that allowed local entities to enter into 
cooperative contractual agreements with the federal government to enforce federal immigration 
laws — specifically recognizes the separate and possibly divergent interest of state and local 
entities.  The provision allowed local institutions to negotiate and contract directly with the 
federal government irrespective of the views of the state within which it is located.  For example, 
whereas neither the State of California nor the City of Los Angeles have seen fit to enter into 
such an agreement with federal immigration authorities, the County of Los Angeles agreed to a 
cooperative arrangement and independently negotiated the specific terms its enforcement would 
entail.73 That local institutions may act independent from, and possibly in contrast with, the 
 
68 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193 §§ 400 – 451, 
110 Stat. 2105, 2260-76 (codified in section 8 of 42 U.S.C.).  Certain benefits were restored to a small subset of 
immigrants in the following years.  See, e.g., Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 5301-5308, 111 
Stat. 251, 597-603 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (restoring eligibility of some legal 
immigrants for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits); Agricultural Research, Extension and Education 
Reform Act of 1998 §§ 503-504, 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A), (F) (restoring eligibility of some legal immigrants for 
Food Stamps). 
69 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1); id. § 1622(a); see also id. § 1632(a) (authorizing states to “deem” income and resources of 
immigrant sponsors as those of the sponsored immigrant in calculating eligibility); 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (authorizing 
states to provide benefits to illegal immigrants “only through the enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, 
which affirmatively provides for such eligibility”).   
70 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“Immigration Reform Act”), Pub.L. No. 
104-208 § 113, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)). 
71 Id. at  § 642; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (Supp. V 1999) (prohibiting any restrictions on state or local government 
entity (without mentioning officials) from exchanging information with federal immigration agencies).   
72 Compare, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live With Immigration Federalism, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1627 (1997), 
with Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and 
Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 493 (2001). 
73 See Linton Joaquin, L.A. County to Enter Limited MOU with ICE to Permit Immigration Enforcement at County 
Jail, Immigration Rights Update, Feb. 10, 2005, available at
http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/arrestdet/ad085.htm. 
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policy aims of the state as a whole have not been fully explored in the literature on immigration 
federalism.   
3. The Normative Outlook of Immigration Law 
 
I have argued that the failure of the local government literature to consider the legal construction 
of immigrants might be explained by the normative outlook of most local government scholars.  
In many ways, the corresponding absence of the city as a legal concept in the immigration 
literature could be understood this way as well.   
 
So far, the most important issue in the immigration scholarship appears to be the difference 
between the legal status of noncitizen immigrants and naturalized or native citizens.  Thus, the 
normative push of most immigration scholars relies on anti-discrimination grounds.  Even while 
some have noted the decreasing significance of citizenship,74 immigration scholars increasingly 
contend that the distinction between citizens and aliens should matter less in setting the social 
and economic rights of immigrants who reside within the nation.75 Therefore, it can be argued 
that the tendency of most immigration scholars to neglect the relevance of local political 
boundaries or fail to distinguish the legal and political construction of local communities from 
that of the state is attributed to the fact that these distinctions do not directly factor into the fault 
lines that motivate the antidiscrimination push of this field of scholarship.   
 
But municipal boundaries and local residency matter.  Contrary to the myth that intra-national 
migration is unhindered, the existing structure of local government law plays a role in 
determining who lives where and the consequences of local residency.  So, just as immigration 
scholars fixate on the uneven allocation of economic resources and opportunity across the globe 
in assessing the moral basis for immigration controls, the organization of our local spaces 
necessarily defines the future impact that contemporary immigration will ultimately have.  Even 
in the immigration federalism debates, the consequences of residing in one locality as opposed to 
another makes a significant difference, especially with the increasing devolution of public 
services down to the local level.  It means very little if states decide to provide certain services or 
benefits, such as education, to immigrant populations if they also allocate primary responsibility 
for those services to local governments.  Whether one locality can or will provide such services 
ultimately hinges on the legal framework that allocates the state’s resources among the 
communities themselves.  
III. The Immigrant City as a Legal Concept 
 
To understand and transcend both the invisibility of the immigrant city in the legal academic 
literature and the wide-spread belief that local communities have very little to do with 
immigration, we must examine the latent intersections between immigration and local 
government law in legal doctrine.  We must consider not only how the development of 
 
74 See generally Peter H. Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American Citizenship, 3
Geo. Immigr. L.J. 1 (1989). 
75 See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 59, at 174 (arguing that “once an immigrant is admitted and takes up permanent 
residence in the Unites States, discrimination on the basis of alienage alone begin to appear arbitrary.”).   
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immigration law has excluded the city, but also identify the legal conceptualizations of the city 
that have both led to and are a result of this exclusion.     
 
To demonstrate this requires us to push beyond the legal presumption that immigration is a 
purely federal issue.  Thus, in Part III.A., I begin with a critical reexamination of this 
presumption.  I find that the conventional account of federal exclusivity relies upon not only the 
doctrinal federalization of immigration law, but also the conceptual federalization of the 
immigrant population.  Nevertheless, by focusing almost entirely on federal government’s 
interest over immigration in describing the need for federal exclusivity, this account ignores how 
legal constructions of the “local” also play a large role in advancing the doctrinal exclusion of 
local governments from the immigration project.   
 
Indeed, as I argue in Part III.B., immigration is now understood as a purely federal issue not only 
because of the strong federal interests, but also because of largely unexamined fears harbored by 
judges and policymakers at the federal, state, and even local level over the relationship between 
immigrants and local communities.  In support of this, I identify three stylized models of the 
immigrant city, each of which corresponds with different and competing fears of the “local” in 
the immigration context: (1) the immigrant city as a threat to immigrants, (2) the immigrant city 
as a threat to the nation and the states, and (3) the immigrant city as a victim of immigration and 
national immigration policy.  These models illustrate the conflicting anxieties about localism 
underlying the presumption of federal exclusivity.  In other words, we have a hard time 
imagining how local governments can play a role with regard to immigration because, at a 
fundamental level, we do not trust the institutional capacity of local governments to do so 
without either trouncing upon the rights of immigrants, undermining the interest of the nation or 
the state, or being entirely overwhelmed by immigrants and immigration policy.   
 
Uncovering the influence of these fears on the doctrinal divergence of immigration and local 
government law also allows us to entertain ways in which the immigrant city can be reimagined.  
If an identifiable set of legal developments arising under specific historical contexts lead to the 
proliferation of these models of the immigrant city, another set of legal developments, hopefully 
more conscious and considered in its approach, could uphold a competing model that imagines 
local communities as valuable partners in our immigration project.  Thus, in Part III.C, I explain 
how understanding the immigrant city as a legal concept in this manner sets the groundwork for 
exploring possible alternative conceptualization of the immigrant city, which we will turn to in 
Part IV.   
A. The Conventional Account: Doctrinal Divergence 
 
The Constitution does not expressly delegate immigration powers to the federal government.76 
Nevertheless, it is now almost universally accepted that immigration is an exclusive federal 
 
76 Constitutional support for federal immigration powers is usually justified with respect to a combination of related 
delegated powers (The Commerce Clause, Naturalization Powers, The War Power, and the Migration and 
Importation Clause, Foreign Affairs Power), an appeal to inherent powers (national sovereignty), or with reference 
the construction and structure of the Constitution (necessity, government structure, and citizenship).  See Thomas 
Alexander Aleinikoff, et al., Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy 185 – 95 (4th ed. 1998). 
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issue.77 Indeed, one can hardly dispute the federal government’s strong interest in immigration.  
Immigration implicates not only the sovereign integrity of our nation’s geographic borders, but 
also the democratic integrity of our national polity.   
 
The fact that immigration is an issue of national importance, however, does not necessarily 
explain the relative absence of any discussion of immigration from a local perspective.  In 
contrast, federal involvement in domestic issues such as housing, transportation, and urban 
economic development has produced an immense body of literature focusing on the impact of 
federal policies on the organization of local communities.  Rather, I suggest that the striking 
absence of such analysis results from two peculiar features of the development of contemporary 
immigration regulations: the federalization of immigration law and the federalization of the 
immigrant population.  It is the operation of both of these processes that has led immigration to 
be conceived of as a national issue even when we are discussing its local impacts.   
1. The Federalization of Immigration Law 
 
For almost a century after this country’s founding, state, local, and federal authorities all played a 
role in immigration.  As Professor Neuman pointed out, in absence of federal restrictions on 
immigration the states enacted and local governments enforced78 a variety of legislative 
measures regulating the immigration of convicts, paupers, the disabled, those suspected of 
carrying contagious diseases, and free blacks and slaves.79 Moreover, aside from restrictions, all 
levels of government took steps to recruit immigrants80 and assist in their settlement.81 The 
federal government enacted laws establishing minimum health and safety requirements for 
steamships carrying immigrants to our shores and sought to encourage settlement by providing 
federal land,82 while “in almost every state” and “supplemented by local associations in cities 
and towns for the same purpose,” legislations were passed to establish “bureau[s] of immigration 
whose purpose is the inviting of immigration and assisting immigrants in the procuring of 
suitable homes.”83 
77 See Wishnie, supra note 72, at 494. 
78 Moreover, financial proceeds generated from local or state enforcement often went to fund local services.  See In 
re Ah Fong, 1 F.Cas. 213 (1874) (describing a California bonding requirement that was “conditioned to indemnify 
and save harmless every county, city and county, town and city of the state” for any relief or support provided to 
immigrants); City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 105 (1837) (describing a state law that permitted the mayor of 
New York to impose a bond on arriving immigrants intended to “save harmless the mayor, &c., of the city of New 
York, and the overseers of the poor of the city, from all expenses of the maintenance of such person . . . .”).  
79 See generally, Gerald Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1833 (1993). 
80 See Bill Ong Hing, Defining America through Immigration Policy 119 (2004) 
81 For example, the State of New York established a Board of Commissioners on Immigration in 1847 to work with 
various immigrant aid groups and the city to protect recent immigrants from fraud, help ease them into life in New 
York City, and recommend policies regarding immigration.  One of their accomplishments was the establishment of 
Castle Gardens, a welcoming facility that predated Ellis Island.  See Leonard Dinnerstein & David M Reimers, 
Ethnic Americans: A History of Immigration 31 (1977, 1999).    
82 See e.g., Act of February 22, 1847 (“Passenger Act”), 9 Stat. 127 (one of three bills regulating the condition of 
ships carrying immigrants); Homestead Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 392-394 (granting ownership of undeveloped land to 
applicants, including immigrants, willing to develop it).   
83 Our Doors are Open and Immigrants Will be Welcomed: The South’s Invitation to All, The Atlanta 
Constitution, Apr. 26, 1888, at 1.   
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In the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, immigration doctrinally evolved into an 
exclusive federal issue.  Noting that immigration implicated federal concerns such as foreign 
affairs, international trade, sovereignty, and national security, the Supreme Court proclaimed that 
“the passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to 
our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States.”84 To be sure, this proclamation preceded 
any substantial federal involvement in immigration.  But because this reallocation of power also 
led several state immigration statutes to be struck down, it prompted the federal government to 
step in to fill the legal void, which, for the most part, simply meant replicating many of the same 
restrictions that had since then been imposed by states and localities.85 
The irony of this federalization lies in the fact that although the Court justified federal 
exclusivity on the basis of the national and transnational interests involved in immigration, the 
federal government’s initial forays into this field revealed a solidly local outlook.  Both the 
renegotiation of the Burlingame Treaty with China in 1880 and the Chinese Exclusion Act that 
followed were largely based on the federal government’s distress at the local impact of 
immigration.86 The subsequent adoption of two of the oldest immigration restrictions — the 
exclusion of those likely to become a public charge and the deportation of immigrant convicts — 
transformed state and local regulations concerning immigrant paupers and local criminal activity 
into a federal immigration restriction long before the federal government began to play an active 
role in providing welfare services to indigent residents or regulating local criminal activities.87 
Indeed, even the very first restrictive federal immigration statute, the Page Law of 1875 
prohibiting the entry of Chinese women for “lewd and immoral purposes,” focused primarily on 
the preservation of the traditional family structures — what many consider to be “the 
quintessential symbol of localism.”88 
Moreover, despite the jurisprudential federalization of immigration law in the late nineteenth 
century, states and localities continued to enact de facto immigration regulations.  They imposed 
restrictions on the ability of immigrants to own land,89 work on public projects,90 operate certain 
 
84 Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280.  
85 See Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control In America 69 (2002) (noting 
that federal regulations “essentially nationalized state policies governing European immigration that had been struck 
down by the Court.”) 
86 Unlike the original Burlingame Treaty of 1868, 16 Stat. 793, T.S. No. 48, the revision added a provision that 
allowed the United States to regulate, limit, or suspend (but not prohibit) Chinese immigration if it “affects or 
threatens to affect the interests . . . of any locality within the territory thereof.”  Burlingame Treaty of 1880, 22 Stat. 
826, T.S. No. 49.  The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 appeared to  have invoked this renegotiated clause by 
declaring that exclusion was necessary because “the coming of Chinese laborers to this country endanger[ed] the 
good order of certain localities within the territory” of the United States. Ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, preamble.   
87 See Neuman, supra note 79, at 1897 (“[t]he issues of crime, poverty and disease among immigrants were treated 
as matters of legitimate local concern.  It was not until 1876 . . . that the Supreme Court puffed them up into foreign 
policy questions.”).  
88 Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 641, 647 
(2005); see also id. at 634. Moreover, the initial supporters of this bill in Congress were primarily concerned about 
protecting specific local communities: “Chinese women . . . are brought for shameful purposes, to the disgrace of the 
communities where settled and to the great demoralization of the youth of these localities.”  S. 971, 1188 H.R. 1588, 
pp. 3 – 4, reprinted in E. P. Hutchinson, Legislative History of American Immigration Policy 1798 – 1965, at 65 
(1981). 
89 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923). 
90 Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915). 
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business,91 or engage in trades that involved state resources92 — all of which required the 
Supreme Court to draw and revise countless jurisprudential lines and rebalance myriad 
competing interests in order to reconcile state and local police powers with the exclusive plenary 
power of the federal government over immigration, with no clear rule in sight.  As a result, in 
recent years states and localities have continued to use local laws to influence the flow and 
incorporation of immigrant populations into their jurisdictions.  The English-only movement and 
Proposition 187 are some of the most cited examples of anti-immigrant activities by sub-national 
governments.93 Others, such as the efforts by some local communities to pass and enforce 
housing code regulations in response to the overcrowded living conditions of immigrant 
households and anti-loitering provisions to control or outlaw the congregation of immigrant day-
laborers, are also examples of local regulatory activities that are intended as local immigration 
restrictions.94 
These accounts of local involvement in immigration, however, are for the most part but a 
footnote in the overarching narrative.  Immigration law is almost universally considered a 
distinctly federal affair involving federal interests and national concerns.  As such, the 
presumption of federal exclusivity tends to render the entire subject of immigration uniquely 
separate from local issues or local governments.     
2. The Federalization of the Immigrant Population 
 
The presumption that immigration laws are in the exclusive province of the federal government 
goes far in maintaining the federal/local divide with regard to immigration.  But, as I noted 
above, it does not fully account for the almost exclusive federal orientation endemic in the 
contemporary immigration debates.  Therefore, to excavate the reason for this peculiarity 
requires us to delve deeper into the evolution of contemporary immigration law — beyond the 
fact that immigration law was federalized, to the corresponding fact that, in many ways, the 
immigrants themselves were as well.   
 
What this means is that not only do we think of immigration as a federal issue, but we also tend 
to think of immigrants as a federal, and ultimately hypothetical, population.  Exclusionary 
immigration controls that regulate who may enter this country and the conditions upon which 
they may remain have worked to conceptually remap the nation’s boundaries: instead of being 
limited to the geographic boundaries of this country, it now appears to be drawn around the 
individual immigrants themselves.  As Professor Ngai suggests, it is as if the “nation’s borders 
(the point of exclusion) collaps[ed] into and bec[ame] indistinguishable from the inner (the space 
of inclusion).”95 Conceptually, as a result, where an immigrant resides, a pocket of federal 
jurisdiction is thought to exist. 
 
91 Clarke v. Deckebach 274 U.S. 392 (1927).  
92 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
93 See Gerald Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of the Equal 
Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1425, 1445 (1995); Dennis Baron, The English-Only Question: An 
Official Language for Americans? 179 (1992) 
94 See supra TAN 40- 41.   
95 Ngai, supra note 27, at 63.   
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Moreover, the structure of federal enforcement now primarily relies on a system of federal 
classification that “discriminates, surveys, and produces immigrant identities.”96 Multiple and 
malleable immigrant statuses are the foundation of our immigration regime, and the flexible 
partition between legality and illegality has given the federal government substantial control over 
the political, social, and cultural identity of immigrants in this country.97 Therefore, just as the 
federalization of immigration law conceptually removed immigration from local government 
scholar’s field of view, the federalization of immigrants rendered the immigrants themselves 
conceptually and, in the case of most illegal immigrations, literally invisible in the local spaces 
in which they reside.   
 
Even now, the federalization of immigrants plays a significant role in distorting traditional 
debates over local issues when immigrants are involved.  When immigrants overcrowd 
inadequate housing or residents flee a community experiencing an immigrant influx, too often 
the traditional local government concerns about affordable housing and the propensity of existing 
local government laws to promote metropolitan sprawl are cast aside to focus on the federal 
immigration policies that sanctioned, or failed to restrict, the immigrant’s entry into this country 
in the first place.98 When immigrant residents burden local services, questions regarding the 
funding structure are frequently neglected to concentrate on the lack of federal support for “its” 
population.99 When immigrants deviate from local community norms by committing crimes that 
are largely defined by state and local governments, the most pressing concern is too often not 
how they will be punished or rehabilitated pursuant to local laws, or how local policies can be 
adopted to make our communities safer, but whether their actions constitute cause for 
deportation.100 Indeed, even when the cities erupt in violence as they did during the Los Angeles 
riots of 1992, the presence of immigrants in the midst of this chaos lead many to demand a 
moratorium on future immigration instead of focusing on the concentration of poverty, racial 
tensions, and economic dislocation that the current local legal framework has engendered.101 
B. Three Models of the Immigrant City 
 
Thus far, I have described the conventional account of immigration and how this account 
primarily relies on the federal interests to justify the presumption federal exclusivity.  What has 
yet to be determined is whether this presumption is not only a result of interests from above, but 
is also influenced by concerns from below.   
 
96 Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics 19 (1996). 
97 See Susan Bibler Coutin, Legalizing Moves: Salvadoran Immigrants’ Struggle for U.S. Residency 10 – 11 
(1999).   
98 See, e.g., Charisse Jones , Crowded Houses Gaining Attention in Suburbs, USA Today, Jan. 31, 2006, at A5 
(describing how anger over immigration is being played out through the issue of overcrowded housing in many 
communities); Blaming Immigrants, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 2000, at A18 (describing a campaign by Federation for 
American Immigration Reform blaming immigration for traffic congestion and suburban sprawl).  
99 See Peter Skerry, Many borders to cross: is immigration the exclusive responsibility of the federal government?,
Publius, June 22, 1995, at 71; see also infra TAN 202 -205.  
100 See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and Limited Scope of Proposed 
Reforms, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1936, 1949 – 50 (2000).   
101 See Jack Miles, Blacks vs. Browns, Atlantic Monthly, October 1992 (vol. 270, issue 4) at 41; Otis L. Graham Jr. 
& Roy Beck, To Help Inner City, Cut Flow of Immigrants, L.A. Times, May 19, 1992, at B7; Edward N. Luttwak, 
The Riots: Underclass vs. Immigrants, NY Times, May 15, 1992, at A29.   
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This section argues that although exclusive federal power over immigration is usually justified 
on the grounds that immigration is “a national matter[] . . . intrusted [sic] to the government of 
the Union,”102 concerns about “local matters” also play a substantial role in buttressing the 
presumption of federal exclusivity.  Indeed, I find traces of three competing “models” of the 
immigrant city in judicial, legislative, and political developments that have contributed to our 
contemporary understanding of the issue of immigration.  Moreover, although these models 
adhere to conflicting concerns about the immigrant city, they are oriented toward the same result: 
disengaging the city from issues of immigration and disentangling the immigrant from the local 
communities in which they reside.   
1. The Immigrant City as a Threat to Immigrants  
 
For those concerned about the rights of immigrants, the common wisdom is that local 
governments are especially threatening to immigrant residents.  More so than the nation as a 
whole, local communities are regarded as hotbeds of intense xenophobia that are structurally 
inclined to adopt policies that discriminate against immigrant minorities in their midst.103 As this 
section demonstrates, one can discern this view of the immigrant city in three of the most 
prominent doctrinal pillars of contemporary immigration law: the plenary power doctrine, Yick 
Wo, and the political function doctrine.  
 
On the one hand, this fear of local oppression arises from a general distrust of municipal 
power.104 In these cases, we see reoccurring concerns about the constitutional boundaries that 
restrain state and local power.  On the other hand, the view that immigrants are particularly 
susceptible to local discrimination has also led jurists to encourage the very condition by which 
immigrants are made susceptible to political oppression at the hands of a local majority.  In the 
name of protecting immigrants, jurists have advanced the assumption that the legal identity of 
immigrants is largely defined by the relationship between the United States and the immigrant’s 
country of origin.  Although such an orientation provides a measure of federal protection for 
immigrants facing local oppression, it also pushes the immigrant population away from being 
seen as a part of the local communities within which they reside and towards being understood as 
federal wards under the direct and exclusive charge of the federal government.   
a. The Plenary Power Doctrine. — No doctrine dominates the jurisprudential reasoning of 
immigration law more than the plenary power doctrine.  At the same time, it is also one of the 
most heavily criticized doctrines of constitutional jurisprudence.105 As the doctrine arose from 
 
102 Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).  
103 See Nueman, supra note 93, at 1437 – 38 (describing “several reasons for special concern about state, as opposed 
to federal, propensities to oppress aliens,” especially in particular local communities within those states); Wishnie, 
supra note 72, at 552 – 59. 
104 This fear of the local is, of course, neither new nor confined to the immigration context.  Arguments against the 
decentralization of political power to local communities have long rested on the ground that such small-scale 
institutions are more likely to foster majoritarian factions that “concert and execute their plan of oppression . . . 
[and] invade the rights of other citizens.”  Federalist No. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); 
see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[R]acial discrimination against 
any group finds a more ready expression at the state and local than at the federal level.”).   
105 See Wishnie, supra note 72, at 503 (“The plenary power doctrine has suffered withering criticism as a shameful 
and racist relic.”). 
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disputes about the treatment of immigrants at the local level, it is worthwhile to consider how it 
influenced, and was influenced by, concerns about the immigrant city.  
 
Indeed, what is striking about the early plenary power cases is how hostile the courts were to 
decentralized power.  Consider, for example, the two cases that solidified the federal 
government’s plenary power over immigration vis-à-vis state and local governments: Henderson 
v. Mayor of New York106 and Chy Lung v. Freeman.107 In Henderson, the Court was asked to 
review a uniform head tax levied against immigrants to compensate for the fiscal and social 
strain of supporting immigrant paupers.108 In Chy Lung, the Court was presented with a similar 
local effort to seek payment from immigrants — a California statute that granted local customs 
officials broad discretionary power to demand bond or payment for landing immigrant 
passengers that are deemed, among other things, “likely to become a public charge, . . . or likely 
soon to become so, or is a convicted criminal, or a lewd or debauched woman.”109 Decided in 
the same term, the Supreme Court struck down both statutes for interfering with the federal 
government’s exclusive power over immigration and foreign affairs.  Nevertheless, in doing so, 
the Court expressed strong reservations about local power and its effects on immigrants and the 
interests of the nation as a whole. 
 
First, the Court was concerned about the potential for abuse when local officials are granted 
broad discretionary powers.  In Chy Lung, the Court criticized the state statute for “plac[ing] in 
the hands of a single man the power to prevent entirely vessels engaged in foreign trade, say with 
China, from carrying passengers, or to compel them to submit to systematic extortion of the 
grossest kind.”110 As the Court explained, “individual foreigners, however, distinguished at 
home for their social, their literary, or their political character, are helpless in the presence of this 
potent commissioner. . . . and so a silly, an obstinate, or a wicked commissioner may bring 
disgrace upon the whole country, the enmity of a power nation, or the loss of an equally 
powerful friend.”111 Moreover, looking at the enforcement structure, the Court concluded that 
“[i]ts manifest purpose . . . is, not to obtain indemnity, but money.”112 To be sure, in these cases, 
the “local” officials that the Court chastised were officials of the state and not local governments.  
Nevertheless, as we will see, the language employed by the Court here would be adopted and 
echoed even more forcefully with respect to local government officials in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.
Second, the doctrine also relied on viewing the immigrant population as an extension of the 
foreign sovereigns from which they immigrated.  Immigrant rights were therefore understood as 
arising less from domestic constitutional protections and more from diplomatic obligations.  As 
the Court explained in Henderson, striking down the state’s restriction vindicated “the protection 
which the foreigner has a right to expect from the Federal government when he lands here a 
stranger, owing allegiance to another government, and looking to it for such protection as grows 
out of his relation to that government.”113 In other words, the Court was concerned that although 
 
106 92 U.S. 259 (1875). 
107 92 U.S. 275 (1875).  
108 92 U.S. at 266. 
109 92 U.S. at 276. 
110 Id. at 278. 
111 Id. at 279. 
112 Id. at 281. 
113 92 U.S. 259, 273 - 74. 
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aliens “have some virtual representation in Washington by means of the foreign affairs 
establishment,” neither state nor local governments are institutionally accountable in the same 
manner.114 
Of course, as much as these cases federalized the issue of immigration, they did not overtly 
dismiss the sphere of local police powers over immigrants.  The Supreme Court did not directly 
question the ability of state and local governments to exclude paupers, lunatics, and those 
carrying contagious diseases from their jurisdiction in the interest of local self-preservation. 115 
But the court’s decision also left state and local governments with very little room to exercise the 
police powers that they might have possessed.  By questioning the ability of local officials to 
make the determination of whether an immigrant is to be categorized as an individual who can be 
regulated by local police powers, as the Court did with respect to the procedure outlined in Chy 
Lung, while at the same time questioning a state’s ability to charge a uniform fee across the 
board to compensate for the inevitable entry of such immigrants, as the Court did in Henderson,
the Court left very little room for any residual police powers to operate.   
 
More importantly, these early plenary power cases reveal an internal tension in this model of the 
immigrant city.  If one of the underlying motivations of the plenary power decisions was the 
Court’s desire to protect immigrants from local oppression, this doctrine also simultaneously 
undermines immigrant participation in local politics and empowerment through the exercise of 
local power rather than this nation’s “foreign affairs establishment.”  Thus, although these cases 
secured temporary relief for immigrants, it also pushed the immigrant population away from 
being viewed as component parts of the local political community and toward their construction 
as guests under the care of the federal government.  It is therefore no surprise that the ascension 
of the plenary power doctrine and the increasing understanding of immigration as an issue 
entwined with foreign affairs coincided with the precipitous decline of alien suffrage in the 
United States.116 
114 See Neuman, supra note 93, at 1436–37. 
115 See Henderson, 92 U.S. at 275; Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280. 
116 Jamin Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historic, Constitutional, and Theoretical Meanings of Alien 
Suffrage, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1391, 1415 - 16 (1993).  
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b. Yick Wo v. Hopkins. — A similar distrust of local decentralization can also be seen in the 
well-known case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins.117 As any student of constitutional law would likely 
recount, Yick Wo is not only one of the first cases to apply the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to governmental acts of racial discrimination, but it also set the legal 
precedent for proving such a violation when laws that are neutral on its face are applied by 
government officials in a discriminatory manner.  As the Court held, although the ordinance 
passed by the City of San Francisco in this case merely required all laundry businesses that 
operated out of wooden facilities to apply for a license in order to continue their operations, the 
fact that almost all non-Chinese applicants were able to secure a license while Chinese applicants 
were almost uniformly denied constituted an application of law “with a mind so unequal and 
oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the state of that equal protection of laws” 
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.118 
For immigration scholars, Yick Wo also established an equally significant precedent with regard 
to the constitutional status of immigrant aliens.  Noting that the Fourteenth Amendment 
conspicuously referred to “peoples” and not “citizens,” the Court proclaimed that its “provisions 
are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard 
to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.”119 
These two lines of argument dominate much of the discussion of Yick Wo. Nevertheless, this 
conventional analysis overlooks a substantial portion of the opinion regarding the municipal 
power of the City of San Francisco to enact or implement its ordinance.  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court in Yick Wo was not merely troubled by the fact that the City of San Francisco applied its 
regulatory regime with an “evil eye and unequal hand” against its Chinese residents.  The Court 
was also concerned about the governing principles regulating “the quasi legislative acts of 
inferior municipal bodies” and the responsibility of “judicial tribunals [to] pronounce upon the 
reasonableness and consequent validity of their by-laws.”120 
That municipal power was a central focus of the Court’s analysis is hardly surprising when one 
takes note of the manner in which this case was presented to the Court.  The primary arguments 
did not focus on whether aliens were entitled to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
In fact, notwithstanding the Court’s memorable pronouncement that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects aliens and native citizens alike, the City of San Francisco never asserted otherwise.  
Rather, the arguments centered on the powers delegated by the California Constitution to the 
city.  Whereas counsel for the city described San Francisco as an “Imperial City” and repeatedly 
asserted that California’s Home Rule provisions imbued the city with “general legislative power” 
equal to that of the state and which “ordinary municipalities did not possess,”121 the petitioner’s 
brief began with the assertion that “it is against natural right to make [operating laundaries] 
dependent upon the arbitrary will of the [city’s] Board of Supervisors” and cited Dillon’s 
Treatise on Municipal Corporations to argue that municipalities do not have the power to define 
 
117 118 U.S. 356 (1886).  
118 Id. at 373. 
119 Id. at 369. 
120 118 U.S. at 371 (emphasis added). 
121 Brief of the City of San Francisco at *15 – 16, Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356. 
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what constitutes a nuisance through local legislation.122 In other words, although the race and 
alienage of the Chinese laundrymen were important to the determination of the case, the general 
municipal powers of the city was also a central issue in the case.   
 
It is therefore fitting that in the sections preceding the Supreme Court’s penultimate conclusion 
about the constitutionality of San Francisco’s enforcement of its local ordinance, the Court’s 
discussion was focused predominately on the scope of the city’s power to regulate local 
laundries.  Invoking two state court cases, neither of which implicated the Fourteenth 
Amendment nor involved any allegations of racial or alienage discrimination, Justice Matthews 
cautioned that courts must be wary of situations in which an “ordinance, passed under grants of 
power [from the state] . . . is so clearly unreasonable, so arbitrary, oppressive, or partial, as to 
raise the presumption that the [state] legislature never intended to confer the power to pass it, and 
to justify the courts in interfering and setting it aside as a plain abuse of authority.”123 Therefore, 
just as it was deemed unreasonable for the City of Cincinnati in State v. Cincinnati Gas-Light & 
Coke Co. to fix the price of gas to force a local gas company to submit to an unfair appraisement 
of their work, 124 or for the City of Baltimore in City of Baltimore v. Radecke to give the mayor 
the power to grant and revoke licenses for the use of steam-engines within the city,125 the Court 
explained that “ordinance[s] which clothe[] a single individual” with the discretion to permit or 
exclude a particular business, “hardly falls within the domain of law, and [the courts] are 
constrained to pronounce it inoperative and void.”126 
It is interesting to note that although the Court’s discussion repeatedly questioned the legitimacy 
of imbuing an individual with “personal and arbitrary power,” in none of these cases did the 
municipal governments delegate administrative power to anyone other than an elected official.  
The “individuals” that the Court spoke of were none other than the municipal officials involved 
in either drafting (the Board of Supervisors in Yick Wo and the City Council in Cincinnati Gas-
Light & coke Co.) or enforcing (The Mayor in City of Baltimore) the ordinances in question.  In 
this manner, the Court’s critique replicates much of the same distrust of local discretion set forth 
in the Court’s earlier plenary power cases.  Yet, instead of confining its criticism to 
administrative officials charged with the enforcement of a particular statute or ordinance, it 
extends the same critique to government officials that constitute the core of a locality’s 
democratic institution.   
 
This perspective also casts light on the Court’s citation to Dillon’s Treatise on Municipal 
Corporations at the beginning of its constitutional analysis.  Notwithstanding the fact that the city 
of San Francisco claimed to possess broad and inherent powers to regulate businesses and local 
activity to serve the public interest — an interpretation that received the support of the California 
Supreme Court127 — the Court in this case started with Dillon’s doctrinal presumption that 
“every [local] by-law must be reasonable, not inconstant with the charter of the corporation, nor 
with any statute of parliament, nor with the general principles of the common law of the land, 
 
122 Brief of Appellant-Plaintiff at *3 - 5, Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356. 
123 118 U.S. at 372. 
124 18 Ohio St. 262, 300 (1868). 
125 49 Md. 217 (1878). 
126 118 U.S. at 372. 
127 See In re Yick Wo, 68 Cal. 294, 297 – 98 (1885).   
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particularly those having relation to the liberty of the subject, or the rights of private 
property.”128 It is well known that Dillon’s fear of municipal power was founded primarily upon 
his conviction that local governments often distort the workings of the private market by 
participating in the private sector or enacting municipal regulations to favor certain forms of 
private activity over others.129 Similarly, the Court’s analysis in this case evinces a similar 
sentiment.  As the Court explained, the potential for abuse lies in the fact that municipal 
corporations  
 
may, and quite likely will, bring ruin to the business of those against whom they are 
directed, while others, from whom they are withheld, may be actually benefited by what 
is thus done to their neighbors; and, when we remember that this action or non-action 
may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism 
and other improper influences and motives easy of concealment, and difficult to be 
detected and exposed, it becomes unnecessary to suggest on comment upon the injustice 
capable of being wrought under cover of such a power.130 
In the end, because the actual administration of the ordinance sufficiently demonstrated irrational 
discrimination against Chinese residents, the Supreme Court found that it did not need to pass 
upon the validity of the San Francisco ordinance in the abstract.  There was no indication, 
however, that the exceptional circumstances in this case negated the underlying basis for its 
concern.  Indeed, the Court never disclaimed its municipal power analysis as being irrelevant.  In 
contrast, it simply held that because of the facts presented in this case, it needs not “reason from 
the probable to the actual” in deciding the validity of the statute.  In other words, in addition to 
being a case about protecting racial minorities or immigrant rights, Yick Wo also appears to be 
an affirmation of the limited and constrained role of local governments in its vision of the 
constitutional order.131 
I do not mean to argue that the conventional understanding of Yick Wo is incorrect.  I do 
suggest, however, that it may be incomplete.  I present this alternative reading of Yick Wo as a 
challenge to the conventional belief that alienage cases in immigration doctrine turn entirely on 
the Court’s assessment of the position of noncitizen aliens relative to citizens.  Its perception of 
the appropriate scope of local government powers also affects how it weighed the legitimacy of a 
city’s regulatory activity against immigrant aliens.  In other words, what was at stake was not 
simply immigrants rights, but also the boundaries of local power with respect to immigrants in 
our constitutional order.   
c. Discrete and Insular Minority and the Political Function Doctrine. — As we have seen, 
concerns about the immigrant city as a threat to immigrants have, on the one hand, compelled the 
courts to construe immigrants as a federal population in order to justify their protection from 
local oppression while, on the other hand, pushed for further federalization of alienage 
regulations because of fears that immigrants are susceptible to local oppression.  In seeking to 
 
128 Id. at 371. 
129 See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1111 – 12 (1980). 
130 118 U.S. at 373.  But see Yick Wo, 68 Cal. at 298 – 99.  
131 But see Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (deferring to the City of Cincinnati’s decision to prohibit 
aliens from acquiring a license to operate pool and billiard halls).  
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protect the immigrant in this manner, however, the Court seems to promote the very conditions 
that generated the need for judicial intervention in the first place.  Here, we see traces of this 
development in the contemporary intersection of the plenary power doctrine and Yick Wo: the 
political function doctrine.  
 
The political function doctrine arose from concerns about local discrimination against noncitizen 
immigrants, but eventually evolved into a general statement on the membership of immigrants in 
local communities.  Following the principles outlined in Yick Wo, the Court had declared that 
because of their inability to participate in the political process, “[a]liens as a class are a prime 
example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority” and therefore regulations discriminating against 
them are subject to “close judicial scrutiny.”132 At the same time, adopting the perspective that 
immigrants are inherently a federal population, the federal status of immigrants with regard to 
the national polity became all the more important in determining the membership of immigrants 
in the local political community.  Thus, although most alienage discrimination at the local level 
is subject to strict scrutiny, the public function doctrine carved out an exception for 
discrimination that is “employed in defining [the] ‘political community.’”133 
The basic premise of the public function doctrine is that “persons holding state elective or 
important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions . . . [who] perform functions 
that go to the heart of representative government” can be required by state and local governments 
to have federal citizenship.134 As a result, the central question in these cases is whether the 
position at issue “go[es] to the heart of representative government.”  Without an apparent bright-
line rule, the Court has applied this exception to teachers,135 policemen,136 and probation 
officers,137 but not to lawyers,138 notary publics,139 or general civil service positions.140 
To be sure, our federalist system gives states and localities broad discretion to define the 
membership of its polity without regard to membership in the national community.141 
Nevertheless, instead of justifying the political function doctrine on the ground that states and 
localities have discretion in this regard, the Court’s rationale continued to construe immigrants as 
a federal population by relying on the federal consequences of alienage and applying it across the 
 
132 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) 
133 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973).  This did not need to have been the case.  As Professor 
Aleinikoff noted, even when Justice Blackmun described immigrants as the quintessential discrete and insular 
minority in Graham, he also articulated another reason for striking down the state’s discriminatory statute — that 
immigrants “are indistinguishable from other residents of the state” and “the state can offer no legitimate reason for 
singling them out.”  Alieinikoff, supra note 59, at 174.    
134 Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647. 
135 441 U.S. 68, 
136 435 U.S. 291 (1978). 
137 454 U.S. 432 (1982) 
138 413 U.S. 717 (1973) 
139 467 U.S. 216 
140 413 U.S. 634 
141 See, e.g., In Re Wehlitz 16 Wis. 443, 478 (1863) (arguing that “previous to the adoption of the constitution of the 
United States” and not surrendered afterwards, “every state had the undoubted right to confer upon whomsoever it 
pleased the character of a citizen, and to endow him with all its rights” (citing Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 
How.) 393, 405 (1856), superceded in part by United States Const. amend XIV).  But see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 
489, 504, 511 (1999) (holding that the Constitution restricts the ability of States to “select their citizens”).  
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board.  As the Court explained, “[t]he exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes is 
not a deficiency in the democratic system but a necessary consequence of the community's 
process of political self-definition . . .  Aliens are by definition those outside of this 
community.”142 As such, the federal definition of “aliens” with regard to their membership in 
the national community is here employed as the baseline for state and local governments as well.  
 
Yet, by championing immigrant exclusion from the local political community, this doctrine tends 
toward a vision of local communities as those in which immigrants are not a part, and solidifies 
the role of the court as the final arbiter of the manner in which local communities can consider 
alienage when enacting local policies.  Thus, by implicitly endorsing the exclusion of immigrants 
from the local polity, the Court entrenches the view of the immigrant city as an ever looming 
threat to immigrants at the same time it attempts to provide cities with a measure of institutional 
discretion. 
2. The Immigrant City as a Threat to the Nation and the States 
 
The model of the immigrant city as a threat to immigrants comports with the Madisonian view of 
local governments as vehicles for majoritarian oppression.143 But if much of this concern arises 
from the political impotence of noncitizen immigrants, could local governments not also serve as 
a democratic tool by which their interest could be mobilized, represented, and put into action?  
Although local governments are often defended as conducive to democratic participation, when 
it comes to immigrant cities, these ideals are often contested.  Indeed, the legal developments 
explored in this section reveal that immigrant political participation at the local level often raises 
fears that cities are too easily co-opted by immigrant interests.  As a result, not only is the 
immigrant city perceived as a threat to the immigrants, but the immigrant city is also often 
simultaneously construed as a threat to the integrity and interests of the nation and its 
constitutive states.   
 
The writings of DeTocqueville, which are often employed as a counterpoint to the Madisonian 
account, aptly illustrate this concern.  On the one hand, DeTocqueville wrote strongly and 
passionately about the contributions of local governments.144 On the other hand, his writing 
reveals a deep-seated concern about large city governments and their immigrant populations:   
 
The lower orders which inhabit [America’s largest] cities constitute a rabble even more 
formidable than the populace of European towns.  They consist of free blacks . . . [and] a 
multitude of Europeans who have been driven to the shores of the New World by their 
misfortunes or their misconduct . . . .  I look upon the size of certain American cities, and 
especially on the nature of their population, as a real danger which threatens the future 
security of the democratic republics of the New World; and I venture to predict that they 
will perish from this circumstance unless the Government succeeds in creating an armed 
force, which, while it remains under the control of the majority of the nation, will be 
independent of the town population, and able to repress its excesses.145 
142 Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 440 – 41 (1982). 
143 See supra note 104.   
144 See generally, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America Vol. I (Henry Reeve trans., 1904). 
145 Id. at 356 - 57 n.1; see also Aristide R. Zolberg, A Nation by Design 125 – 26 (2006). 
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It is ironic that DeTocqueville, in a treatise espousing the importance of decentralized power and 
writing during a time when immigration regulations were largely in the hands of state and local 
governments, would anticipate the federalization of immigration and the mobilization of federal 
officials to police the urban immigrant population — predicting that “armed force,” accountable 
solely to the nation and not the local communities, “was to be the hope not only for city 
government but of the nation itself in face of the threat that comes from large cities.”146 
In some respect, the concerns that immigrants and cities would concert to frustrate the interests 
and goals of the nation and the states arise from the cultural heterogeneity of the immigrant 
city.147 But this fear is also, more importantly, based on the legal framework of municipal 
governance and political decentralization in the United States.  Instead of seeing the city as being 
controlled by native contingents bent on frustrating the rights and privileges of immigrants, 
however, this model posits just the opposite: immigrant cities are prone to being co-opted by 
immigrant interests, which in turn poses unique threats to national- and state-level policies.148 
Moreover, as we proceed in this section, we should take note of the degree to which state and 
local interests diverge.  As we have seen, most accounts of the “local” do not distinguish 
between state and municipal governments.  This section, however, reveals that this distinction is 
critical.  In many instances, the states feel just as, if not more, threatened by their immigrant 
cities than the nation as a whole.   
a. The Municipal Reform Movement and Local Political Participation. — For immigration and 
local government scholars, the decades surrounding the turn of the twentieth century were a 
pivotal era.  Not only did this period mark one of the most significant and contentious influx of 
immigrants in American history, but it also witnessed a fundamental transformation of American 
society from an agrarian to a largely urbanized society.149 America was becoming an immigrant 
country at the same time it was realizing that “the twentieth century city [would] be decisive of 
national destiny.”150 
At the same time commentators were beginning to realize the transformative impact of 
immigration and urbanization, there was also widespread alarm over these developments.  More 
importantly, concerns about immigration and cities were essentially intertwined.  Many believed 
that the physical and political ills of the American city were the result of its immigrant residents.  
Not surprisingly, advocates for municipal reform and immigration restrictions found a lot of 
 
146 William Anderson & Edward W. Weidner, American City Government 4 (revised ed., 1950). 
147 Jon C. Teaford, The Twentieth-Century American City 2 (2d ed., 1993) (“The jumble of immigrants who 
congregated in the cities, speaking foreign tongues, practicing strange customs, and adhering to alien religions 
appear[] to threaten the very unity of the nation.”).  
148 Josiah Strong, The Twentieth Century City 101 (1970) (1898) (“[Immigrants], as they come to us, are clay in 
the hands of the political potter.  If they remain uninstructed as to good citizenship, and incapable of forming 
individual judgments concerning public questions, the boss will certainly rule the city when the city rules the 
nation.”). 
149 See generally Arthur Schlesinger, The Rise of the City: 1878 – 1898 (1933).   
150 Strong, supra note 148, at 32; see also Delos F. Wilcox, The American City: A Problem in Democracy 22 
(1911) (“The city problem is a national problem, and there is no excuse for indifference in regard to it on the part of 
any citizen.”).   
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common ground and often worked hand-in-hand: in cities like Boston, “many leaders of 
[municipal] reform were leaders of the Immigration Restriction League.”151 
Indeed, the “political machines,” which for many signified the failings of city governments, were 
inextricably tied to the intellectual inaptitude or political deviance of the immigrant “masses.”152 
Many municipal reformers who were theoretically committed to political decentralization were 
wary of the capacity that immigrants and their children, who made up the vast majority of the 
urban population, had for democratic self-rule.  For example, Wilcox, who was at times a strong 
advocate of municipal power, cautiously warned of the corrupting influence of these foreign 
elements: “America’s condition is analogous to that of a club originally composed of more or 
less select class brought together by a common experience and a common intelligence for 
furtherance of certain great ends, but later well-nigh swamped by the influx of strangers with 
little notion of the original purposes of the club and meager training for membership in it.”153 
Rather than attributing the rise of machine politics to ignorance, other municipal reformers 
believed that immigrants were “deliberately vot[ing] in support of the theory that government is 
for the benefit of those who govern” and “stolidly submitting to the band of pirates who have 
cast its municipal institutions into the quicksand of corruption.”154 
As a result, at the same time municipal reformers were pushing for local governments to assume 
a more prominent role in American politics,155 anti-immigrant forces joined up with municipal 
reformers to disentangle immigrant residents from local governments.  Their goal was to 
depoliticize the city by removing politics from urban government and restructuring local 
governments into efficient administrative apparatuses, either through a government of 
independent boards and commissions that would govern at a distance from neighborhood-level 
demands and concerns, or a city-manager structure in which an executive would run the day-to-
day affairs of the city without undue intrusion by the political process.156 In each of these, the 
ultimate, and in many cases, intended effect was the disentanglement of immigrants and other 
“undesirable” municipal residents from the day-to-day operations of the city.157 
Although the municipal reform movement generated substantial interest among political and 
business elites in the Northeast, cities in the Southwestern states actually adopted municipal 
reform much more readily than their New England counterparts.158 Political scientists and urban 
scholars have long debated why this regional variation occurred.  The dominant “class theory” 
posits that municipal reform was largely a middle-class movement with support from local 
business elites.159 Nevertheless, noting the largely inconclusive nature of these endeavors, some 
 
151 Edward C. Banfield & James Q. Wilson, City Politics 141 (1963).  
152 See Dinnerstein & Reimers, supra note 81, at 80. 
153 Wilcox, supra note 150, at 5 - 6.    
154 ___ ; see also Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United 
States 120 – 23 (2000) (describing resistance against alien suffrage on the ground that they “lack[ed] the judgment, 
knowledge, and commitment to American values necessary for salutary participation in elections,” “their apparent 
inclination toward radicalism,” and their support for political machines and “so-called boss rule.”).   
155 See generally, David Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 Harv L. Rev. 2255, 2277 – 2321 (2004).   
156 See e.g., Teaford, supra note 147, at 39. 
157 See Banfield, supra note 151, at 171 (“[municipal reform] appealed to a good many people as a convenient 
means of putting Catholics, the Irish, the Italians, the labor unions, and all other ‘underdogs’ in their places.”).   
158 See Amy Bridges, Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the Southwest 3 (1997).  
159 See Amy Bridges & Richard Kronick, Writing the Rules to Win the Game, 34 Urb. Aff. Rev. 691, 692 (1999). 
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scholars have sought to find alternative explanations.160 For example, Professor Bridges and 
Kronick point out that the success of the municipal reform movement in the Southern and 
Western states might be better explained by concurrent state efforts to disenfranchise immigrant 
and minority voters.  In other words, “reformers were able to win where they could shape the 
electorate by disfranchising their opponents and were most successful where their opponents 
were weak at the polls.”161 In other words, the cities in which municipal reform was most 
successful were also ones in which the state stepped in to suppress, and therefore redefine, the 
local electorate.162 
That last point is worth repeating: legal reforms of local governments at the state level were 
crucial to the success of municipal reform in many communities because it shaped the local 
electorate in ways that made these structural reforms possible.  Underlying this intrusion by the 
state was a fundamental distrust of local governments because they were perceived as being 
unduly and easily influenced by working-class minority and immigrant elements.163 
Moreover, in seeking to fix the city, the reform movement also drastically altered the 
institutional role of the city relative to its most needy and vulnerable residents.  Notwithstanding 
the fact that in the beginning, a noteworthy faction in the municipal reform movement believed 
that machine politics “would disappear once the city itself provided the services currently offered 
by the boss,” the National Municipal League, which led the reform movement, “diagnosed 
municipal ills ‘as a problem of institutional structure and governmental machinery.’”164 As a 
result, the reform model “not only endorsed political and administrative arrangements, but also a 
very limited sphere of local government.”165 
Even today, immigrant communities are wrestling with the effects of state mandated or state 
facilitated reform and its effect on immigrant representation in local governments.  To be sure, a 
few municipalities currently allow immigrants to vote in specific or general local elections.166 
Nevertheless, other cities that have sought to join that group have been unable to secure state 
approval even after garnering local support for that proposition.167 Moreover, studies have found 
that the municipal organization of local governments continues to have measurable effects on the 
political participation of immigrant groups who, having naturalized, are entitled to vote.168 
160 See id. at 696. 
161 Id. at 693. 
162 See Bridges, supra note 158, at 66. 
163 It was no secret that in many states, literacy and educational requirements for suffrage were specifically targeted 
at Mexican immigrants, who were thought to be unfit to exercise the franchise.  See Bridges et al., supra note 159, at 
698.  Discrimination against Asian immigrants at the polls was more obvert: in all of the 11 western states Asians 
were entirely forbidden to vote.  See id.
164 Bridges, supra note 158, at 8. 
165 Id.
166 See Raskin, supra note 116, at 1465 & n.387. 
167 See Matt Viser, Proposal Would Let Noncitizens Vote, Boston Globe, Nov. 25, 2004, at 1 (noting that two cities 
in Massachusetts have voted to grant alien suffrage, but cannot implement it because the state has not granted their 
“home rule” petitions).  
168 See e.g., John Mollenkopf et al., supra note14, at 36 (arguing that the different political structure of local 
government affect immigrant political incorporation).  
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b. City of Pasadena v. Charlesville. — The preceding section illustrates that notwithstanding the 
tendency of most immigration scholars to conflate state and local governments, the two often 
have divergent interests with regard to immigrants.  It is therefore no surprise that concerns about 
municipal entanglements with immigrants would also arise as an important site of legal 
contention about the contours of municipal home rule in the following decades.  In this vein, the 
California Supreme Court’s decision in City of Pasadena v. Charlesville169 presents a fascinating 
look into how divergent interests between state and local governments can lead to incongruous 
results on related issues.  As we see, even when cities are granted broad discretion to handle 
local issues, introducing immigrants into the judicial equation radically alters the balance.     
 
In Charlesville, the City of Pasadena “petition[ed] for a writ of mandate to compel the 
respondent as city manager of the city . . . to sign a contract authorized by the board of directors 
of said city for the construction of a galvanized fence around the Allen reservoir, a property 
owned and used by said city as part of its municipally owned and operated water supply and 
distributive system.”170 The city manager’s refusal to sign the contract was based upon his belief 
that it violated state law.  First, he contends, the contract did not contain a specification of the 
“prevailing rate of per diem wages as required by the Public Wage Act of 1931,” and second, it 
failed to include “a provision forbidding the employment of noncitizen immigrants as provided 
by the Public Works Alien Employment Act of 1931.”171 The city does not dispute its 
noncompliance with these regulations.  Rather, Pasadena argues that as a city with a “freeholder” 
charter (more commonly known as a “home rule” charter), it need not comply with the state’s 
public works requirement because the project was a “municipal affair.”172 
On its face, Charlesville presents a fairly straightforward legal question.  It was well-accepted 
that municipalities were exempt from compliance with state laws with regard to municipal 
affairs.  The only question was whether the exception applied.173 From this perspective, there 
appears to be two ways that this case can be resolved.  On the one hand, if one focuses on the 
nature of the project itself — the construction of a fence around a municipal water source — the 
municipal affairs exception seems appropriate.  The city appears to be acting in its most private 
capacity: it was entering into a contract and paying with municipal funds to complete a project 
for the sole benefit of local residents.  On the other hand, if one focuses on the manner by which 
the project was to be completed — through the use of laborers who may not be paid a prevailing 
wage or possess citizenship — there is a strong argument that Pasadena transgressed the 
boundaries of its municipal powers.  Unlike the municipal project in question, the effect of its 
activities on wages and hiring cannot be easily confined to the boundaries of the municipality.   
 
In theory, these two approaches are mutually exclusive.  Moreover, they should dictate the same 
result with respect to both the prevailing wage and citizenship requirements.  In a unanimous 
decision, however, the Charlesville court adopted analytical elements from both to reach 
different conclusions on the propriety of the city’s noncompliance.  In doing so, the court’s 
 
169 215 Cal. 384 (1932), overruled in part by Purdy and Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal.2d 566, 585 – 86 (1969) (finding 
the state statute implicated in Charlesville unconstitutional). 
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reasoning exposed how legal regulations relating to immigrants often drastically affect court’s 
conception of municipal power even when cities are granted significant local control over their 
affairs.   
 
With respect to the prevailing wage requirement, the court focused almost entirely on the project 
itself to conclude that, notwithstanding any extra-municipal impacts the city’s noncompliance 
may have on the state’s labor market, its activity was a “municipal affair.”  As the court 
explained, all the component parts of the project were municipal affairs: “the improvement 
contemplated by the contract . . . [whose] sole purpose . . . is the construction of a wire fence 
around a reservoir which is part of the city’s municipal system,”  “the control of [local] 
expenditure,” and the “hiring of employees generally by the city to perform labor and services in 
connection with its municipal affairs and the payment of the city’s funds for services rendered to 
the city by its employees in the administration of its municipal affairs” are all themselves 
municipal affairs.174 
In contrast, the court’s analysis of noncitizen immigrant employment on municipal works took a 
dramatic about-turn.  First, the court did not center its inquiry on the project itself.  Instead, it 
focused more specifically on the city’s actions by framing the legal question as one over whether 
“the employment of aliens on public works [was] one of local concern and a municipal affair.”175 
Second, and most important, the court subverted its previous municipal affairs analysis by 
declaring that municipal property was essentially state property.  It did this by redefining the 
state and all its “agencies” as trustees for the citizens of the state: “All public works and all 
public property in the state in a broad sense belong to all the people of the state.  Whether the 
ownership or title thereof be in the state or in a municipality . . . such ownership and title are held 
in trust for the people of the state.”176 Having done so, the court was quick to conclude that the 
employment of noncitizen immigrants on municipal works implicated state sovereignty, and as 
such “constitute the subject-matter thereof of general state concern as distinguished from local or 
municipal affair.”177 Moreover, the court emphasized that as creatures of the state, 
municipalities had an obligation to protect municipal property qua state property: “since the 
property and funds of the state and its agencies, in a broad sense, belong to its citizens, it would 
seem to be a wise and beneficent state policy so to conduct its affairs that its funds be available 
to its citizens for services rendered on public works.”178 
Note the court’s conceptual moves here.  When it was assumed that all the individuals involved 
were citizens, the court was willing to construe the city as essentially a private entity 
representing the interests of its residents.  The introduction of noncitizen immigrants, however, 
drastically changed the overall equation.  Because, from the court’s perspective, the most 
significant dichotomy was no longer between the city and the state, but between citizens and 
noncitizens, the court’s earlier municipal affairs analysis did not factor into its assessment of 
noncitizen employment at all.  The role of the city also changed accordingly.  It was construed as 
an organ of the state, and therefore its property and funds were essentially state resources held in 
 
174 Id. at 390 
175 Id. at 398 (emphasis added). 
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 399. 
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trust.  The independent municipal ownership that factored so prominently in the court’s earlier 
assessment no longer remained.  In short, as the immigrant gained in legal prominence, the city 
— as a legal, political, or economic entity — seemed to disappear entirely from view.   
c. Local Sanctuary Policies and City of New York v. U.S. — The recent controversy over local 
enforcement of immigration laws suggests that fears of the immigrant city as a threat to the 
nation and the states continue to be pertinent in today’s immigration debates.  Already, a wide 
range of legal disagreements over this issue have placed localities in an awkward position.  On 
the one hand, a vigorous debate rages over whether local police officials even have the power to 
enforce federal immigration laws179 or whether such power is reserved exclusively for federal 
officials by nature of federal preemption.180 On the other hand, assuming local enforcement is 
permitted, others disagree over whether federal immigration laws require local officials to 
cooperate with the federal government181 or whether cooperation must be at the discretion of 
local communities.182 
At the center of this debate are the well-known inadequacies of immigration enforcement.  As 
efforts to physically secure the nation’s boundaries are increasingly exposed as both inefficient 
and insufficient, proponents of enforcement have begun looking to local government officials to 
assist in its patrol of the country’s interior.  Yet, as the growing need for local support in 
immigration enforcement becomes more pervasive and local surveillance more necessary, cities 
are also becoming aware of their ability to challenge and redefine immigration categories 
through local policy.   
 
Indeed, in recent decades many cities have taken steps to restrict local law enforcement and 
administrative officials from cooperating with federal enforcement by adopting so-called 
sanctuary policies.  Currently, there are at least 35 state and local governments, including the 
cities of New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, San Diego, Portland, Seattle, and 
Washington D.C., that have taken steps to limit the ability of their officials to enforce federal 
immigration laws or cooperate with federal immigration officials.183 These jurisdictions often 
defend their policies on the ground that local immigration enforcement strains the relationship 
between police and immigrants, promotes the socio-political isolation of immigrant 
communities, endangers the health and safety of immigrant and native residents, and puts 
 
179 See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make 
Immigration Arrests, 69 Alb. L. Rev. 179, 199 – 201 (2005); Michael M. Hethmon, The Chimera and the Cop: 
Local Enforcement of Federal Imigration Law, 8 U. D.C. L. Rev. 83, 84 – 96 (2004).  
180 Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1084, 1091 
- 95 (2004). 
181 See Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and State Sanctuary Declarations: Innocuous Symbolism or Improper Dictates?,
16 Pepp. L. Rev. 297, 316 – 20 (1989). 
182 See Ignatius Bau, Cities of Refuge: No Federal Preemption of Ordinances Restricting Local Government 
Cooperation with the INS, 7 La Raza L.J. 50, 61 (1994).  
183 See e.g., Lisa M. Seghetti, Enforcing Immigration Law: The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement, 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Oct. 13, 2005 (updated), at 23 n.26; National Immigration 
Law Center, Laws, Resolutions and Policies Instituted Across the U.S. Limiting Enforcement of Immigration Laws 
by Local Authorities, July 2004, at http://www.friendsoftheborderpatrol.com/Local_Enforcement.pdf. 
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substantial fiscal strain on already taxed police departments tasked with dealing with more 
pressing local issues.184 
The manner in which localities are experimenting with different levels of immigration 
enforcement based on local priorities, however, has not gone unnoticed.  Because sanctuary 
cities are often those with large immigrant populations that are “able to exert domestic political 
pressure against INS enforcement . . . [or] facilitate illegal migrants’ ability to melt into the 
community,”185 many have questioned whether these communities are more aligned with 
immigrants than national interests in resisting cooperation with federal authorities.  As a result, 
steps have been taken by both states186 and the federal government to limit local sanctuary 
policies.187 
Again, at the heart of this controversy is how we understand the proper institutional role of local 
governments with respect to their residents and the larger governmental bodies within which 
they are situated.  Although facially described as an immigration issue, the controversy over 
local sanctuary policies raises deeper concerns about what constitutes the relevant community 
when the issue of immigration is raised.  Consider, for example, the Second Circuit case of City 
of New York v. U.S.188 At issue in the case was a series of executive orders issued by successive 
mayors of New York since 1989 that limit the ability of “any City officer or employee [to] 
transmit[] information regarding the immigration status of any individual to federal immigration 
authorities.”189 Because provisions of the 1996 Welfare and Immigration Act threatened the 
validity of this policy by prohibiting any state or local regulation that restricted their employees 
from reporting immigrant-statuses to federal authorities, the city under Mayor Giuliani filed a 
facial constitutional challenge.190 
From the city’s perspective, the challenged provisions “strike at the heart of local government 
autonomy.”191 Relying on the new federalist interpretation of the Tenth Amendment set forth in 
Printz v. U.S.192 and State of New York v. U.S.,193 the city advanced two arguments.  First, it 
argued that “state sovereignty under the Amendment includes the power to choose not to 
 
184 See National Immigration Forum, State and Local Police Enforcing Immigration Laws: Stories from Around the 
Nation, at http://www.immigrationforum.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabid=573. 
185 Peter H. Schuck, The Law and Study of Migration, in Migration Theory: Talking Across the Disciplines 187, 
195 (Caroline Brettell et al. eds., 2000).  
186 See Colorado SB 90 (signed May 1, 2006) (prohibiting state and local governments from impeding local 
cooperation with federal officials concerning an arrestee suspected to be illegal; rendering non-complying local 
governments ineligible for state grants).   
187 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 
2105, § 434 (1996) (prohibiting state and local governments from restricting government employees from who wish 
to provide immigration information to federal authorities); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 § 642 (1996) (same); see also Matt Stiles et al., 
House Puts Pressure on “Sanctuary Cities”, Houston Chron., June 30, 2006, at A1 (describing the passage of an 
amendment in the House spending bill denying federal money to cities and towns with sanctuary policies).   
188 179 F.3d 29 (1999).  
189 Id. at 31 – 32. 
190 Id. at 31; see also supra note 187. 
191 Brief of the City of New York, id., 1997 WL 33546932, at *17 (quoting Amicus Brief of The Legal Aid Society, 
at *4).   
192 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
193 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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participate in federal regulatory programs and that such power in turn includes the authority to 
forbid state or local agencies, officials, and employees from aiding such a program even on a 
voluntary basis.”194 Second, the city contends that the Tenth Amendment prevents the federal 
government from intruding on the “actual operation of state and local government by, for 
example, regulating the use of state and local resources — here officially-acquired information 
— and/or the duties or responsibilities of state and local employees.”195 
The Second Circuit acknowledged that Printz and State of New York bar the federal government 
from directly compelling state or local governments to participate in a federal regulatory 
program or “circumvent[ing] th[is] prohibition by conscripting the State's officers directly.”196 
The court held, however, that the Congressional regulations in this case neither force the city to 
enforce federal immigration laws nor directly conscript local officials to do the same.  “Rather, 
they prohibit state and local governmental entities or officials only from directly restricting the 
voluntary exchange of immigration information with the INS.”  As the court explained, allowing 
state or local governments to foreclose such voluntary participation by its employees would “turn 
the Tenth Amendment's shield” against federal intrusion of state and local sovereignty “into a 
sword allowing states and localities to engage in passive resistance that frustrates federal 
programs.”197 
The holding in City of New York is often championed by opponents of local sanctuary policies.  
On the basis of the court’s reasoning, however, it is not entirely clear that its conclusion, though 
intuitive, follows existing constitutional jurisprudence.  Indeed, it appears that the court’s 
“voluntary exchange” rationale only works when we dismiss the legal significance of local 
governments either as political institutions or as private employers.  In other words, the court’s 
reasoning seems to work best when we privilege the identity of local government officials as 
American citizens over their concurrent roles as municipal employees or municipal residents.   
 
To see this, we must begin by examining the court’s rationale.  First, was the court correct in 
distinguishing the challenged provisions in this case from those involved in Printz or State of 
New York? To be sure, Congress did not explicitly require New York City to enforce federal 
immigration law or conscript local officials to become federal immigration officers.  
Nevertheless, the law left cities with no option other than to tolerate the discretionary 
cooperation of individual local officials.  In other words, the city is essentially being forced to 
participate in federal immigration enforcement and accept de facto conscription of its employees 
if its employees independently choose to cooperate.  It is not entirely clear that a constitutionally 
significant distinction between being forced to participate in a federal regulatory program and 
being prohibited from choosing not to cooperate exists.  Moreover, the ruling seems to raise a 
central concern in both the plenary power cases and Yick Wo about how delegation of 
discretionary power to local officials raises the potential for abuse.198 By upholding the federal 
restriction in the manner that it did, the Second Circuit essentially requires cities to grant local 
 
194 179 F.3d at 34. 
195 Id.
196 Id. at 33 – 34 (citing and quoting State of New York, 505 U.S. at 157, and Printz, 521 U.S. at 935). 
197 Id. at 35; see also Hethmon, supra note 179, at 85 (“To turn an official blind eye to violations of federal 
immigration law in such circumstances is not an exercise of sovereignty, but rather impermissible passive resistance 
to federal law.”).   
198 See supra, TAN 110 - 112, 126.   
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officials far-reaching discretion over their treatment of immigrants without the ability to reign in 
or regulate that discretion.199 
To be sure, one can argue that the court’s reasoning is actually less concerned about the 
operations of the Tenth Amendment than upholding federal plenary power over immigration 
enforcement.  Recall that the court’s primary reason for refusing to apply the “Tenth Amendment 
shield” was because the court believed that cities like New York would use it as a “sword” to 
frustrate federal programs.  But the city’s policy did nothing to prevent federal immigration 
officials from enforcing federal immigration laws.  To be sure, federal immigration enforcement 
is certainly more difficult without local support.  Yet it is hardly distinguishable from the 
situation in either Printz or State of New York.
Last, the court’s technical parsing of Printz and State of New York appears to do a disservice to 
the substantive constitutional considerations underlying the Tenth Amendment test.  As the 
Court explained, the primary need for the Tenth Amendment “shield” is to preserve the 
constitutional structure of dual sovereignty and ensure that individuals affected by the regulatory 
regime could properly assign political accountability to the government that is responsible.200 
From this perspective, the challenged federal provisions in City of New York were exceptionally 
problematic.  The city and amicae went to great lengths to note how permitting local government 
officials to essentially become rogue agents of the federal government would strain the 
relationship between the local government and immigrant residents because they would likely 
see the cooperation as an official policy of the city.   
 
If the court’s reasoning is so vulnerable to criticism, then why is it that City of New York has 
largely been exempt from such even while local enforcement of immigration laws remains a hot 
topic of discussion?  One explanation might be the fact that the court’s reasoning, although 
problematic, taps into an underlying concern about immigrant cities like New York becoming 
too influenced by local pro-immigrant interest at the expense of federal considerations.  Another 
is that it successfully presents local government officials as members of the national polity 
irrespective of their professional responsibilities to, or membership in, the local communities of 
which they are a part.  Indeed, support for this reading can be gleaned from the court’s emphasis 
on the need for “informed, extensive, and cooperative interaction of a voluntary nature between 
sovereign systems for the mutual benefit of each system” in the preservation of a system of dual 
sovereignties.  It is difficult to understand how cooperative interactions of a voluntary nature are 
increased by the challenged provision when state and local communities were free to cooperate 
with the federal government before its enactment, but were foreclosed from choosing otherwise 
after its enactment.  It would appear that the challenged provision can only be understood to 
promote voluntary cooperation if the discretion of local government officials is privileged over 
that of the representative government that employs them.   
 
199 This is not merely a hypothetical concern.  The infamous Rampart scandal in Los Angeles, in which members of 
the police department’s anti-gang task force were revealed to have engaged in a far-reaching conspiracy of 
corruption, excessive force, and police abuse, illustrates how local officials can rely on the persistent and looming 
threat of deportation to coerce and threaten local immigrant communities in furtherance of personal, as opposed to 
municipal, objectives.  See Elana Zilberg, Fools Banished from the Kingdom: Remapping Geographies of Gang 
Violence between the Americas (Los Angeles and San Salvador), 56 Am. Q. 759, 759 – 60 (2004).   
200 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 920, 929 – 30. 
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3. The Immigrant City as a Victim of Immigration  
 
Thus far, I have argued that the immigrant city is often construed as a threat to immigrants, the 
states, or the nation.  Coexisting alongside these accounts of the city, however, is also a more 
benign and sympathetic view of the immigrant city.  Local communities are also thought of as 
being especially vulnerable to the impact of immigrants.  As such, the city is often-times 
perceived as the ultimate victim of immigrants and immigration policy.   
 
Like the models of the immigrant city explored above, this model of the immigrant city 
structures the legal powers of local governments in the immigration framework.  Unlike the 
previous models, however, this perception of the immigrant city is not only perpetuated by 
federal actors, but embraced by state and local officials as well.  As we will see, even while 
seeking to assist local communities, federal policy continues to neglect the role of local 
governments and relegate them to the sidelines of immigration policy.  At the same time, instead 
of exploring ways in which local government laws can be reformed to better enable local 
communities to adjust to the needs of immigrant residents or the burdens occasioned by 
population influxes in general, state and local officials often scapegoat immigrants for local ills 
while throwing their hands up in frustration by attributing their problems to federal policy.       
a. Seeking Federal Reimbursement. — The impact of immigration on contemporary American 
cities is both pragmatically irrelevant and discursively crucial.  On the one hand, neither 
immigration nor immigrant status seems to play a significant part in structuring the daily routines 
and prosaic rituals of urban and suburban life.  Their demands of local governments are often no 
different than that of anyone else, and the impact of their entry into the community are often 
difficult to differentiate from natives returning from a foreign country, relocating from a different 
state, or moving from a neighboring locality.201 On the other hand, immigration and immigrant 
status play a crucial role in how we legally and politically conceptualize the function of local 
governments, the value of local communities, and the purpose of local services.  In distributing 
limited resources and political power, efforts are often made to maintain a distinction between 
immigrants and non-immigrants.  From this perspective, immigrants — both legal and 
undocumented — are carved out of the local community and reconstituted as a federal ward.   
 
Although the doctrine of federal exclusivity has often been employed to support the former, in 
doing so, it has also fueled support for the latter.  Indeed, much of our inclination toward seeing 
immigrants as a federal population is the result of state and local officials relying on the 
distinction between immigrant and native residents to argue that they are disproportionately and 
unfairly burdened by immigrants living in their community.   
 
The argument of state and local officials in a series of cases seeking federal reimbursement for 
local costs incurred as a result of immigration aptly demonstrates this point.  During the mid-
1990s, state and local officials from New York, New Jersey, Florida, Arizona, California, and 
Texas filed nearly identical claims alleging that the federal government’s failure to internalize 
the costs associated with immigration at the local level violated, among other things, the 
 
201 See Raskin, supra note 116, at 1451 (“While my Canadian or Brazilian neighbors and I may have different 
interests or approaches on international issues like acid rain or regional trade, we presumably have identical interests 
in efficient garbage collection, good public schools, speedy road repair, and so on.”).     
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Naturalization Clause, the Invasion Clause, the Guarantee Clause, and the Tenth Amendment.202 
Although these cases were all rejected at the circuit court level (either on the merits or as a non-
judiciable political questions), the arguments in support of these claims provide substantial 
insight into the prevalence of this victim model of the immigrant city.   
 
Consider, for example, the case brought by representatives of the state and counties of New 
York.  Noting that New York absorbs a significant number of legal and illegal immigrants, it 
claimed to be “disproportionately affected and . . . burdened by the federal government’s 
immigration policy,” and, as such, has become “the victim of an ongoing immigrant 
emergency.”203 Indeed, its particular conceptualization of immigrant residents cannot be made 
more clear than when the plaintiffs claimed that the “costs associated with providing services to 
immigrants” were essentially “costs . . . paid by plaintiffs and the State of New York on behalf of 
[the federal government].”204 
Indeed, notwithstanding the longstanding responsibility of state and local actors to provide local 
services and regulate local economic growth, in all these cases the complaint is that they are 
powerless to effectively address the economic problems caused by the “invasion” of legal and 
illegal immigrants.205 Why alienage or legal status present insolvable dilemmas that are 
fundamentally different from other population influxes, which almost all of these states 
experienced throughout the twentieth century, is never explained except with repeated claims 
that the immigrant population should properly be understood as a federal population and thus a 
federal responsibility. 
 
The fact that none of these claims were given much credit by the judges who heard these cases 
does not undermine the prevalence of this attitude among state and local actors today.  If the 
immigration issue is increasingly becoming a local concern, much of it is due to the fact that 
local communities conceive of immigrants as convenient scapegoats upon which to blame their 
inability to adequately handle growth or unwillingness to accommodate demographic change, 
and the federal government’s perception that their obligation over immigration justifies periodic 
and targeted readjustments of that responsibility.  The immigrant city is understood to be under 
siege by the immigrant masses, and only the federal government is empowered, if it so wishes, to 
provide reinforcements.  As such, this distinction not only supports, but is also a product of, the 
presumption of federal exclusivity that dominates so much of the immigration discussion.   
b. Plyler v. Doe. — The victim model of the immigrant city can also be seen in the well known 
case of Plyler v. Doe.206 Although usually read as a case about immigrant rights, the manner in 
which it was argued before the court reveals how the issue of immigration raises concerns about 
 
202 See Padavan v. U.S., 82 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 1996); New Jersey v. U.S., 91 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1996); Chiles v. U.S., 
69 F.3d 1094 (11th Cir. 1995); Arizona v. U.S., 104 f.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1997); California v. U.S., 104 F.3d 1086 
(9th Cir. 1997); Texas v. U.S., 106 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1997). 
203 Brief of the State and Counties of New York at *4, Padavan, 82 F.3d 23. 
204 Id.; see also New Jersey, 91 F.3d at 467 (describing New Jersey’s argument that that deficiencies in federal 
immigration enforcement has “forced” it to “bear the burden of a responsibility which is that of the Nation as a 
whole”).   
205 See id.
206 457 US 202 (1982). 
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local problems faced by the immigrant population while at the same time conceals the effect that 
local government laws have in creating or perpetuating these problems.   
 
In Plyler, the court was asked to decide whether the Equal Protection Clause prevents the State 
of Texas from denying undocumented immigrants the right to obtain a free public education in 
its local schools.  In a divided 5-4 opinion, the Court held that the relative innocence of the 
undocumented students and concerns about the creation of a permanent uneducated under-class 
counsel in favor of applying heightened scrutiny, which lead it to declare the state statute 
unconstitutional.207 
As such, Plyler is predominantly read as an immigration decision.  It is important to note, 
however, that it is also a case about the state’s organization of local governments: not simply 
because the named party in this case is a local school district or that the Supreme Court has 
recognized that “[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control 
over the operation of schools,”208 but also because at the heart of the case is the inequitable 
educational funding structure challenged and upheld years earlier in the name of local control in 
Rodriguez v. San Antonio School District.209 
In order to see this, we need to take note of two points that are usually neglected.  First is the 
actual statute at issue in this case: Section 21.031 of Texas’s Education Code.  Contrary to most 
conventional accounts of Plyler, § 21.031 did not directly prohibit undocumented children from 
receiving free public education in its schools.  The deprivation at issue was precipitated by two 
distinct and separate provisions.  On the on hand, the Texas statute readjusted how the state 
distributes its educational grants by excluding children who were unable to prove their legal 
status in the country from its calculation.210 To be sure, school districts that served 
undocumented students would be left with less resources overall to educate its student 
population.  Not unlike the Court’s findings in Rodriguez,211 however, there was nothing to 
suggest that any given school district would be rendered incapable of providing an adequate 
education to all its children.  On the other hand, the Texas statue authorized, but did not 
command, local school districts to deny free public education to children who were not a legally 
admitted into the United States.212 Of course, the deprivation of state funding for undocumented 
students gave struggling local school districts incredible incentive to preclude illegal students 
from attending their schools.213 On its face, however, the Texas statute gives local school 
districts the final say on whether or not to exclude.  In this regard, the statute seems to confirm 
Rodriguez’s contention that inequitable distribution of educational funds precipitated by state 
law is permissible if, at its heart, it also serves to (however superficially) enhance local control 
over education.214 
207 See id. at 219 – 20, 223. 
208 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 719 (1974). 
209 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
210 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205. 
211 411 U.S. at 11 – 12, 23 – 24. 
212 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205. 
213 See In re Alien Children Ed. Litigation, 501 F.Supp. 544, 555 (D.C.Tex. 1980).  
214 411 U.S. at 50 – 53. 
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Second, we should note the state’s use of the local victimization rationale in defense of its 
regulation.  In defending the rationality of the state’s educational restrictions at the trial court 
level, the state employed much of the same evidence about inequitable funding raised by 
disadvantaged Hispanic students against the state in Rodriguez. It argued that the poor school 
districts, whose fiscal problems were being exacerbated by both legal and illegal immigration 
and their special needs, were the ultimate and intended beneficiaries of the state’s educational 
reforms.215 Indeed, the state claimed early on that the fiscal health of the state was not the 
issue.216 What was at stake, was protecting financially strapped local school districts saddled 
with the cost of educating undocumented immigrants by stemming the influx, and empowering 
localities to exclude, undocumented students.  
 
Of course, the irony of the state’s position in relation to Rodriguez was not lost upon the district 
court: it “note[d] . . . that any spectator watching the state's presentation of evidence might easily 
have mistaken it for a retrial of the Rodriguez case, with the State of Texas acting as Amicus 
curiae for plaintiffs, emphasizing the plight of the property-poor border school districts under the 
state's educational financing scheme.”217 Moreover, it was from the perspective of Rodriguez
that the district court struck down the state statute as unconstitutional under rational basis review.  
Noting that the root of the problems identified by the state could be better addressed by changing 
the state’s educational funding structure, and was only minimally due to the presence of 
undocumented students, the court held that, “excluding illegal immigrant children because of 
these problems is both irrational, because the undocumented children as a class are basically 
indistinguishable from the legally resident alien children in terms of their needs, and ineffectual, 
because the dominant problem remains unsolved.”218 
Interestingly, despite these points, the Supreme Court never directly approached the issue in this 
case from a local perspective.  Why was this the case?  First, it could be that the Court 
recognized that the decision of local school districts to exclude undocumented students was 
essentially a false choice in light of the state’s deprivation of the educational grants, especially 
when the state-sanctioned educational funding structure compels most local school districts to 
become dependent on state assistance that are constantly subject to change.  Alternatively, it 
could be that delving too deeply into the relationship between the state and the local government 
in the educational context would generate too much tension between Plyler and Rodriguez. As 
the dissent noted, it is difficult to reconcile the Court’s belief that the undocumented student’s 
“lack of responsibility” for being in the United States in this case counseled in favor of not 
penalizing them with regard to education when the same “lack of responsibility” of the plaintiff’s 
children in Rodriguez with regard to their residency in property-poor school districts had no 
noticeable influence on the Court determination that inequitable funding for public education is 
constitutionally permissible.219 Indeed, if the Court had separated the local decision to exclude 
and focused entirely on the state’s deprivation of funds, as would have been the case if a local 
school district like Edgewood had challenged the state funding structure without exercising the 
 
215 See In re Alien Children Ed. Litigation, 501 F.Supp. at 580 – 81. 
216 Id. at 579 (“There is no place in this pre-trial order that the State has said the State of Texas doesn't have enough 
money. Not one place. Texas can come up with the money.”).    
217 Plyler, 458 F.Supp. at 589. 
218 Id.
219 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 245 n.5 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).   
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authority to deny admission to illegal immigrant children altogether,220 the Court may have 
found itself uncomfortably bound with increasing irony to defend the state funding structure on 
the ground that it preserved local discretion to supplement state funds with local resources.221 
Moreover, when Plyler is considered from a local perspective, it raises complicated questions 
about the relationship between immigrants and local communities.  Recall that the in defending 
the political function doctrine, the Court applied a federal conceptualization of alienage as the 
baseline for determining the membership of immigrants in all levels of government by stating 
that aliens are “by definition” those outside of the political community.222 In this case, however, 
when the state sought to defend its regulation on the ground that it was simply establishing a 
requirement for municipal residency — the traditional hallmark of municipal membership — the 
Court balked at the idea that “illegal entry, without more, prevents a person from becoming a 
resident for purposes of enrolling his children in the public schools.”223 Instead, the Court 
maintained that the state must adhere to the conventional understanding of municipal residency 
— one based on physical residence within a particular locality.224 In contrast to the baseline 
presumption that immigrants, especially illegal immigrants, are nonmembers as a result of 
federal classifications, the Court found itself inclined here to adopt the opposite baseline 
presumption, one that suggests the irrelevance of federal alienage classification in the sub-
national sphere.   
c. Immigrant Dispersal and Refugee Resettlement. — State and local actors have not been the 
only ones concerned about cities being too weak to deal with immigration without substantial 
federal support.  Historically, much of federal immigration policy has been concerned about the 
impact of immigration on local communities, especially when such impacts are concentrated in 
specific cities or geographic regions.   
 
One of the reasons why the spatial residency of immigrant groups has proved to be crucial site in 
the immigration debates is because spatial concentration of immigrants raises the most intense 
fears associated with immigration: territorial separatism and demographic balkanization.  To be 
sure, cultural and ethnic differences presented by immigrant groups have long been considered to 
 
220 Cf. Amicus Brief of Edgewood Independent School District at *4, Plyler, 457 U.S. 202 (noting that “the decision 
of this court on the constitutionality of Section 21.031, which would have its greatest impact on poor, urban and 
predominantly Mexican American school districts, is of extreme significance” to the Edgewood Independent School 
District, the district from which the Rodriguez litigation arose) 
221 To be sure, as Justice Powell’s concurrence argued, the complete deprivation of funding in Plyler differed in 
important ways from the equal threshold funding the state provided for all students at issue in Rodriguez. Plyler,
457 U.S. at 239 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).  But considering that educational funding through local property tax 
receipts was as much a part of the state funding structure as its decision to provide state aid to local school districts, 
it is not entirely clear that a state regime that would provide less state aid to schools with undocumented 
schoolchildren differs that dramatically from one that gave impoverished school districts less ability to provide the 
same amount of educational resources as prosperous communities.  Only when this funding deprivation is 
complemented by independent local discretion does the possibility of total deprivation of free education occur.   
222 See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 440 – 41 (1982).  
223 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227 n.22. 
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be sources of discomfort and threat.  When this “diversity” is grafted upon demarcated spaces, 
however, fear about national disintegration begins to form.225 
It is also for this reason that residential mobility in the metropolitan landscape takes on 
additional meaning with regard to immigrants.  Since Burgess of the Chicago school of urban 
sociology linked cultural and social assimilation to the physical and spatial movement of 
immigrant groups across the metropolitan landscape,226 residential mobility, and, more often than 
not, residential mobility into Anglo suburbs continue to serve as a significant measure of 
immigrant assimilation.227 
In order to influence the residential decisions of incoming immigrants, federal agencies initially 
sought to use immigration restrictions to exclude immigrants that were intended for an 
“overcrowded” local labor market.  Nevertheless, in Gegiow v. Uhl,228 Justice Holmes, writing 
for a unanimous court, rejected this approach.  Analyzing the statutory language, the Court held 
that the concern is with the personal attributes of the immigrant, and not the local economic or 
geographic conditions of any particular place within the United States: “The persons enumerated, 
in short, are to be excluded on the ground of permanent personal objections accompanying them 
irrespective of local conditions.”229 
Without the ability to use the regulatory regime to shape immigrant destinations, federal agencies 
turned to other methods.  Noting that the “evils” of immigration are caused primarily by the 
“congestion of immigrants in the cities,” then-commissioner of immigration Frederick A. Wallis 
proposed disbursing information about labor needs in the rural countryside and building stronger 
collaborations between state authorities so as to “better distribute[e] . . . aliens, so that both the 
country and the immigrants might benefit.”230 For the most part, however, these efforts achieved 
limited results.   
 
Our national immigration policy now appears to have largely abandoned any large-scale effort to 
control the residential decisions of immigrant in general.  Yet similar efforts continue with 
respect to the settlement of refugees.  Indeed, refugee settlement now involves an “intriguingly 
complex system whose centerpiece is a weekly meeting at the Refugee Processing Center in 
Arlington, Va.”231 During these meetings, voluntary resettlement agencies, known as “volags,” 
who represent local sponsors, allocate refugees in specific local communities around the country.  
 
225 Indeed, as some commentators have noted, often the only thing separating an ethnic group from a nation is that 
along with asserting claims of cultural affinity, nations also make territorial claims.  Jeff Spinner, The Boundaries 
of Citizenship 28 (1994).  It is therefore no surprise that the recent wave of Mexican immigration to the Southwest 
have led many to see the trend as a “Reconquista” — an effort by Mexico or Mexican nationals to “reconquer” 
Mexican territories that were either annexed or lost to America during the mid nineteenth century.  See e.g., Samuel 
P. Huntington, Who Are We: The Challenges to America's National Identity 29 – 30 (2004).  
226 Ernest W. Burgess, The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project, in The City 47 (1984, 1925). 
227 See Richard Wright & Mark Ellis, Race, Region and the Territorial Politics of Immigration in the US, 6 Int’l J. 
Population Geography 197, 205 (2000).   
228 239 US 3 (1915). 
229 Id. at 4. 
230 Form New Bureau to Handle Aliens, N.Y. Times, Oct 13, 1920, at 27. 
231 David A. Martin, U.S. Department of State, The United States Refugee Admissions Program: Reforms for 
a New Era of Refugee Resettlement 128 (July 8, 2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/36495.pdf. 
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Moreover, because of persistent concerns about immigrant concentration and their impact on 
local communities, the process generally embraces a policy of dispersal.232 
Although the process recognizes the profound local impact in settling refugees, local government 
involvement is surprisingly limited.  Following the precedent set by the Refugee relief Act of 
1953,233 the resettlement program relies primarily on the non-governmental sector to guide local 
resettlement efforts and provide initial financial and social support.234 To be sure, federal funds 
are often allocated to aid such resettlement efforts.  But for the most part federal support is 
limited and often they are turned directly over to charitable organizations willing to take on the 
responsibility.   
 
At the same time, settlement decisions by volags have profound impacts on the developing of 
immigrant communities.  In many instances, the planting of these immigrant seed have resulted 
in massive secondary migration.235 In addition, the selection process is often shaped by the 
inequitable effects of existing local government policies.  The decision to settle Somali refugees 
in the City of Holyoke, one of the poorest communities in Massachusetts, demonstrates this 
point.  After initially entering into an agreement with a local religious organization to settle 
Somali refugees with federal support, the city council sought to back out back out because it 
believed the federal grants were insufficient to counteract its extensive financial problems and 
struggling school system.236 Because consent by local governments is not required in the 
settlement process, however, the federal government initially refused to reconsider its 
decision.237 The irony, however, was that it was precisely because Holyoke was an 
impoverished city that it was considered a prime candidate by federal and charitable groups for 
this type of settlement.  Unlike more prosperous suburbs in the surrounding region, Holyoke had 
an ample supply of affordable housing, which, although not conducive to providing substantial 
taxable revenue, made it an ideal place to settle poor immigrants.238 As a result, like the case in 
Plyler where poor school districts were disproportionately shouldered with the burden of 
educating a disproportionate number of immigrant students, local government policies that have 
produced vastly different communities end up guiding refugee settlement to some degree as well.   
C. The Three Models and its Consequences 
 
The fact that immigration is largely considered a federal issue cannot be entirely understood 
without accounting for the latent fears over local involvement in this issue.  I have sought to 
demonstrate that neither strong federal interests with regard to immigration, nor the questionable 
 
232 See Jacqueline Desbarats, Indochinese Resettlement in the United States, 75 Ann. of the Assoc. of Am. 
Geographers 522, 526 (1985). 
233 See Barbara M. Yarnold, Refugees Without Refuge 13 (1990).  
234 See Martin, supra note 231, at 128. 
235 See e.g., Roy Beck, The Ordeal of Immigration in Wausau, Atlantic Monthly, April 1994, at 84.   
236 See Farah Stockman, Holyoke Disowns an Invitation: Officials Fight Grant for Somali Refugees, Boston Globe,
Oct. 14, 2002, at B1.  
237 See id. Ultimately, the charitable organization chose to settle the Somali refugees in the nearby city of 
Springfield instead.  See Jennifer Graham, Somali Influx Gets Mixed Carolina Welcome: Despite Plight, Bantu 
Refugees aren’t Embraced, Boston Globe, July 13, 2003, at A6.  
238 See Stockman, supra note 236 (noting that many residents felt that Holyoke “was chosen precisely because it has 
social and economic problems,” and that the charities involved recognized that although other communities were 
willing to welcome the refugees, they “don't have the low-priced housing to accommodate them”).   
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belief that only the federal government can solve the problems that immigration produces, 
completely explains our aversion to looking to the “local” for solutions to our immigration 
dilemmas.  We seek to disengage local governments from participating in the immigration 
project because we feel they are either too powerful (and thus a threat to immigrants or the 
nation and the states) or too weak (and therefore vulnerable to immigrant influxes) to assume a 
meaningful role.   
 
To be sure, disempowering and depoliticizing the immigrant city in this manner serves to 
alleviate the underlying, but often unstated, concerns that we have about local participation with 
respect to the issue of immigration.  Yet by perpetuating these models, we not only conceal the 
valuable and unique role that local government can play in the immigration project, but also how 
the legal structure can be changed to realize these benefits.  If we can get past the presumption 
that immigration is a federal issue, we may begin to realize that local governments are often well 
positioned to address a lot of the domestic problems attributed to immigrants while magnifying 
the benefits that they provide to this country.  If we can get beyond the belief that until they 
naturalize, immigrants are a federal population that is by definition outside of all political 
communities, then we can begin to realize that potential that local government have for fostering 
civic participation and promoting tolerance and immigrant incorporation. 
 
In other words, we need not believe that the current conceptualization of the “local” with respect 
to immigration is either desirable or inevitable.  If the immigrant city is understood as not only a 
geographic place, but also a legal construction, we can begin to imagine ways in which power 
and incentives can be changed to enable us to see the potential of looking beyond federal 
exclusivity and seeing immigration as a critical local issue as well.   
IV. Reimagining the Immigrant City 
 
The preceding Part demonstrates that differing concerns about decentralized power has led to the 
development of three competing models of the immigrant city.  In each of these models, the city 
is presented as a problem; in none do we see it being considered as a possible solution to our 
immigration dilemmas.  There is, however, nothing inherent in either the structure or the concept 
of local governments that make the immigrant city either a threat to immigrants, a threat to the 
nation and the states, or a victim of immigration policy.  If local government participation in the 
immigration project raises the concerns highlighted by these models, it is due in large part to not 
only how immigration laws and doctrine structure the relationship between the local and the 
federal through immigration law, but also how local government laws allocates power and 
incentives to our local political institutions.  Realizing this possibility and recognizing the unique 
role that local communities can play, we might see a reason to temper or abandon the 
unquestioned presumption of federal exclusivity in the immigration context. 
 
It is important to note that in reimagining the immigrant city, the choice is not between federal 
exclusivity and unhindered local autonomy.  No matter how much we assert the presumption of 
federal exclusivity, it is unlikely that federal government will be able to address every issue 
affecting immigrants, or that the effect of laws governing local communities will be insolated 
from the prospects of our immigration regime.  Similarly, it would be shortsighted to simply 
empower local communities so that it can be mobilized as another vehicle in the acrimonious 
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conflict over our normative and cultural anxieties over immigration.  Such blind empowerment 
would likely produce no more than the insular and isolated drifts of local communities toward 
opposite extremes that we are beginning to witness today.  Indeed, presented with a choice of 
these extremes, I believe that most of us will likely dismiss both approaches as either undesirable 
or impractical.  Thus, instead of distilling the issue down to these two choices, we might be 
better off considering how cities should and can be empowered and disempowered in order to 
accomplish the substantive goals of the immigrant project — from both the national and local 
perspective.   
 
Accordingly, this Part sets out to do two things.  Section III.A sets out to reorient the terms of the 
debate by proposing a more nuanced approach to understanding the dilemmas that underlie the 
models of the immigrant city.  On the one hand, it argues that the traditional models of the 
immigrant city do not adequately highlight the degree to which successful immigration or local 
government programs are contingent upon the operations of the other. On the other hand, it 
asserts that although we can benefit from foregrounding the intersection between immigration 
and local government law in the manner described above, we must simultaneously be cautious of 
over-attributing local problems to the immigrant influx.   
 
Section III.B then outlines a few possibilities of how we can reconceptualize the institutional role 
of local governments in an era of immigration as an alternative resource upon which to achieve, 
and possibly reframe, the goals of our national immigration policy.  I do not intend for this to be 
an exhaustive list.  Indeed, there is no reason to believe that more cannot be developed once we 
accept the possibilities of the local that are available to us.   
A. Reorienting the Debate: Clarifying the Intersection between Immigration and Local 
Government Law 
1. How Immigration Law Influence Local Community Development 
 
First, we should recognize that immigration laws do not just operate to define the national 
community; it is also a tool by which we construct our local ones.  This is not to say that the 
effect of immigration laws on community-building at the local level should be the sole 
determinant of how we structure our national immigration policies.  It does suggest, however, 
that as we move forward in reforming our immigration laws, we should do so with a serious and 
considered understanding of its effect on our local communities.  
 
It is important to note that this effect is not limited to the subset of “alienage” regulations that 
regulate the lives of immigrants who have already arrived; it extends to even the most basic 
immigration questions of all, such as those concerning who, if anyone is permitted to enter our 
country.   
 
For example, if our immigration policy continued to emphasize family reunification and binding 
financial sponsorship, we would likely see a tendency toward the establishment of immigrant 
enclaves by encouraging familial dependence among the immigrant population.  At the same 
time, allowing immigrants to reunite with family members in American may also promote 
immigrants to develop long-term interests in their communities and invest in local community-
building efforts accordingly.   
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Alternative, if we begin to move our immigration policy toward one that emphasized the 
admission of temporary foreign workers to satisfy the immediate low-skilled employment needs 
of domestic businesses, like the Bracero program of the early 1900s239 or the guest worker 
program currently being debated by Congress,240 we would likely encourage the development of 
immigrant cities populated by sojourners with limited social or political ties to the 
neighborhoods within which they reside.  Of course, from a purely federal perspective, one may 
wish to forestall the development of these ties to better ensure that these workers return to their 
country of origin at the end of their designated tenure.  But even if this is an aim that American 
society is willing to embrace, the prospect of building local communities in which an ever-
present proportion of residents conceives of themselves, and is treated by others, as a floating 
population241 outside of the social and political networks that make communal life possible 
should not be dismissed lightly, especially without an honest acknowledgement this impact in 
considering such a policy.   
 
Indeed, the more we probe how our immigration policy addresses the question of immigrant 
admissions, the more it becomes obvious that the future of our local communities lies in these 
national debates.  Even today, one can argue that the current system, which has led to the growth 
of an underground population and unregulated economy of illegal workers, promotes insular 
“protective” enclaves that frustrate broader efforts at local integration.  At the same time, local 
communities are encouraged by current laws to fixate, wrongly or rightly, on illegal immigrants 
as scapegoats for their social or economic troubles without honestly facing up to and addressing 
the realities of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity without the specter of illegality dominating the 
discussion.   
 
In short, our immigration debates should begin to note that federal immigration policy does not 
operate solely at the borders or exclusively on immigrants.  We must be attuned to how 
immigration policies will affect the type of local communities that we foster in this country.  As 
long as immigrants live alongside us as fellow residents, the immigration laws that affect their 
lives will also have an impact on all those who live within our communities  
2. How Local Government Laws Impact Immigration Policy 
 
Similarly, the legal structure of our local government laws affects more than what are normally 
considered local affairs; the type of communities that our local government structure promotes 
also has significant impact on the success of our immigration policies.  Although America has a 
long tradition of crafting our immigration policy by looking to the local living conditions of the 
existing immigrant population, we must begin to understand that much of this not simply a result 
 
239 See Kitty Calavita, Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the I.N.S. 42 – 72 (1992).  
240 Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Alexandra Villarreal 
O'Rourke, Recent Developments, Embracing Reality:  The Guest Worker Program Revisited, 9 Harv. Latino L. 
Rev. 179, 185 - 90 (2006). 
241 Cf. generally, Li Zhang, Strangers in the City: Reconfigurations of Space, Power, and Social Networks 
within China’s Floating Population (2001) (describing the lives of the “floating population” of the registered rural 
population living as unregistered residents in major cities).   
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of the cultural characteristics or socioeconomic status of the immigrants that we formally or 
tacitly accept, but is also determined by how local government laws operate on the ground.242 
For example, while integration appears to be a major component of our immigration project, we 
should realize that it is dictated to a large degree by local government policies that are too often 
thought of as outside of the realm of the immigration debate or assumed to be unquestionable 
fact of society.  In a pluralistic society in which the end-goal of assimilation is always a relative, 
shifting, and contentious target, an immigrant’s “fit” will almost always come down to personal 
and social connectedness.  Thus, the degree to which immigrants are able to interact with and 
share in the communal lives of American society as a whole play a substantial role in 
determining whether and when newly-arrived immigrants will eventually become a part of the 
mainstream.243 
But if the local is significant in determining immigrant incorporation into American society, it is 
not something that is, or can be solely addressed by our nation’s immigration laws.  The local 
government structure that promotes certain community organizations over others will have to be 
considered as well.  For example, if we continue to adhere to legal policies that segregate our 
lived environments along lines of race, ethnicity, and class, how can we expect the type of social 
and physical connections between immigrants and native residents that would lead to their 
eventual integration into mainstream society?244 
Moreover, if we wish to promote a culture of racial and ethnic tolerance, then how can we 
continue to uphold the norms of white middle-class Americans as the model of assimilation 
when their communal existence thus far seems to be premised on racial, ethnic, and 
socioeconomic homogeneity?  Already, there are increasing concerns about racial tensions 
between immigrants and native minorities.245 But if communal living, social integration, and 
examples of racial and ethnic tolerance are the most promising tools for eroding these 
stereotypes, the segregation between blacks and whites so prominently featured by the current 
organization of local governments does very little to acculturate our newly-arrived immigrants to 
this ideal.246 
242 See Mark Ellis, A Tale of Five Cities?: Trends in Immigrant and Native-Born Wages, in Strangers at the Gates,
supra note 3, at 117, 118 (noting that “the literature provides convincing evidence that the ability of immigrants to 
make economic gains depends on conditions in the places where they settle, not just on the individual characteristics 
they bring with them or acquire while in the United States.”) 
243 See Robert Park and Ernest Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology 739 (1921, 1924) (“The 
rapidity and completeness of assimilation depends directly upon the intimacy of social contact.”).   
244 See id. Indeed, one can see this dilemma in the aftermath of the English Immersion movement that sought to 
better integrate students with limited English proficiency by “immersing” them in English-only classrooms.  Even if 
we accept, for the sake of argument, the pedagogical validity of this method, it is certainly hampered by the fact that 
Hispanic students, especially those who are learning English, are increasingly being educated in segregated schools 
with little chance of interacting with native-English speakers, a vital a component of the immersion process.  See
Russell W. Rumberger & Patricia Gándara, Seeking Equity in the Education of California’s English Learners, 106 
Teachers College Rec. 2032, 2048 – 49 (2004). 
245 See e.g., Jennifer Lee, Civility in the City: Blacks, Jews, and Koreans in Urban America 1-5 (2002)(noting 
the accounts of inter-ethnic conflict between blacks and immigrant newcomers in urban neighborhoods).   
246 See Lawrence Bobo & Camille L. Zubrinsky, Attitudes on Residential Integration: Perceived Status Difference, 
Mere In-Group Preference, or Racial Prejudice?, 74 Soc. Forces 883, 903 – 04 (1996) (finding a distinct racial 
hierarchy with respect to residential choice among all ethnic groups and hypothesizing that Asians and Hispanics are 
internalizing the traditional racial divide in their effort to integrate into American society); cf. Alba & Nee, supra
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Last, if one of the goals of the immigration project is to ensure that today’s immigrants and their 
children participate meaningfully in American society instead of being entrenched in the cycle of 
poverty and disenfranchisement that afflicts so many of our fellow residents, then how can we 
continue to leave unquestioned the local government policies that relegate so many immigrants 
and their children to these neighborhoods and imposes so many obstacles in the way of 
residential, and thus, social mobility?247 By continuing to allocate vital public services 
inequitably according to municipal boundaries, the opportunities and life chances of immigrants 
and their children will likely be guided less by what the nation the immigrants are from, and 
more by the resources and environment they find once they arrive.  Many different forms of 
assimilation are possible,248 and whether immigrants assimilate into one as opposed to another 
will depend a lot on environmental factors within the United States.249 
3. Immigrants as the Miner’s Canary and the Disempowered City 
 
Debates over immigration often bring local issues to the national stage, but, having done so, 
frequently distorts these issues by presenting them solely as immigration questions.  Thus, in 
contemporary political discourse, immigrants often serve as the miner’s canary that propels 
problems faced by local communities to national prominence, while, at the same time, 
concealing or distorting many of the underlying causes of these problems.   
 
The common complaint that immigration overcrowds and overburdens local schools is a good 
example.  On the one hand, the immigration influx into cities like Los Angeles appears to have 
placed an immense strain on local educational facilities and funding.  On the other hand, the 
numbers of students that are now being overcrowded into schools in Los Angeles are still a 
smaller percentage of the overall population than the record set in the late 1960s before the 
modern immigration influx took place.250 Moreover, recent reports show that school districts in 
California are now suffering from declining enrollment and the consequent reduction in state 
aid.251 To be sure, these finding offer little consolation for children and teachers in overcrowded 
 
note 47, at 45 (describing how early Irish immigrants, who were considered racially inferior and analogized to 
African-Americans, “socially distanced themselves from Africa-Americans as a group strategy to gain acceptance 
from Anglo-Americans”). 
247 See Peter H. Schuck, Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens 345 (1998) (noting that inner-city residents, who 
suffer from prejudice and other disadvantages “can powerfully influence — and contaminate — the values of the 
new immigrants’ children” who live in the same communities.) 
248 See Min Zhou, Segmented Assimilation : Issues, Controversies, and Recent Research on the Second Generation,
31 Int’l Migration Rev. 975 (1997) (summarizing and reviewing the segmented assimilation literature).   
249 Indeed, many of the social ills we associate with immigration are often not imports from other countries, but 
domestic products arising from local conditions. See Ana Arana, How the Street Gangs Took Central America,
Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, issue 3, at 98 (2005).   
250 A study of Los Angeles Unified School District found that notwithstanding massive waves of immigration into 
Los Angeles during the latter part of the twentieth century, it was not until 1996 that student enrollment surpassed 
the record-breaking peak set in 1969.  Moreover, because the population of Los Angeles grew steadily during this 
entire time, the proportion of school children relative to the general population was still less in 1998 (18.7%) than it 
was in 1969 (23.2%).  Center for the Study of Latino Health & Culture, LAUSD Enrollments, 1966–1998: 
Shrinkage, Then Recovery, While the City Grew (2001).  
251 Indeed, the current crisis in California’s school system appears to be the adverse effect of declining student 
enrollment and its effect on state aid.  See Catherine Saillant, Fewer Pupils Create More Worries, L.A. Times, July 
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schools.  But we should be ready to acknowledge that although immigration may have raised the 
prominence of this issue, the root problems may actually lie in how local schools are funded or 
their ability to deal with enrollment fluctuations and the negative externalities associated with 
neighborhood segregation and concentrated poverty.   
 
This is all not to say that immigrants do not sometimes present unique challenges to local 
communities, especially when it comes to English education and language assistance.  Indeed, 
one of the points of this article is that they do.  Nevertheless, many of the pressures that cities 
currently face are ones that cities have historically faced with or without immigration.  Indeed, in 
our effort to curb the excesses of local governments, it appears that we have increasingly 
constructed them as political institutions that can do very little to influence their future or adapt 
to changing circumstances.  The fact that this, and not immigration per se, may be an issue worth 
considering is all but concealed by the limited scope of policy debates when immigration is 
implicated.      
4. Reorienting Localism  
 
Last, we may also need to reorient the ideological foundation of localism itself.  Too often, we 
take it as a given that the ultimate purpose of local governments is confined to representing the 
interests and well-being of its current residents.  We should consider how this orientation affects 
a local community’s ability or willingness to anticipate and account for the interests of future 
residents.  
 
Notwithstanding the widely-held belief that the local is the most stable social and political space 
in our lives, almost no community has been able to resist transformations brought about by 
shifting patterns of residency and the changing needs that arise as a result.252 Indeed, 
irrespective of whether the community is a large established urban center or a developing 
residential suburb, it is almost certain that both its population and economic infrastructure will 
undergo a tremendous amount of cycling and transformation in any given amount of time.253 
As a result, we must recognize that any decision made today to serve the interests of the present 
city will ultimately have its most direct and profound effect on a future population.254 With 
regard to the immigrant city, this means that steps should be taken to promote a forward-looking 
orientation of localism that is not simply concerned about the welfare of existing residents, but 
has the foresight and public will to realize that notwithstanding nostalgic ideals usually 
associated with the local, local communities of all sorts are inherently spatial nodes of 
dynamism, fluidity, and change.   
 
31, 2006, at 1; Joel Rubin, L.A. Unified to Lose Millions From Drop in Enrollment, L.A. Times, June 14, 2006, at 
3.  
252 See Frug, supra note 45, at 320 – 22, 332.  
253 For example, a survey of Los Angeles residents who were over 25 years old found that only 27.5 percent were 
born in California; 30.1 percent had migrated from a foreign country and 42.2 percent had migrated from another 
state.  See Dowell Myers, Demographic Dynamism and Metropolitan Change: Comparing Los Angeles, New York,
Chicago, and Washington, D.C., 10 Housing Policy Debate 919, 934 (1999).   
254 Schragger, supra note 56, at 423 (“Future residents of a locality are affected by any number of policies pursued 
by current residents, including those policies made in the recent and not-so-recent past by residents who many no 
longer live in the jurisdiction but that have adversely affected newer entrants.”).   
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B. Expanding the Scope of the Immigrant City 
 
Having set forth a more nuanced account of the intersection between immigration and local 
government law, we can begin to consider how we can restructure the immigrant city to alleviate 
the concerns outlined in Part III and expand its role in our immigrant project.  Accordingly, this 
section proposes some alternative ways of conceptualizing the immigrant city to address these 
concerns.  I argue that (1) instead of construing immigrants as a federal ward and relying on 
“virtual representation” at the federal level for their protection, we can more effectively achieve 
the same ends by severing the relationship between national and local membership and folding 
immigrants into the local polity, (2) we can address the fear of local governments being easily 
co-opted by immigrant interest by exploring ways in which local, immigrant, and national 
interests converge and the role that local governments can play in furthering these joint 
objectives, and (3) instead of fixating on the financial and social costs of immigration on local 
communities, local governments can act to promote the potential benefits that immigrant 
residents can bring.   
 
No doubt that while some cities would benefit by adopting all, some, or a combination of these 
proposals, others will likely seek alternatives not set forth below.  The benefit of political 
decentralization, however, is that with the proper institutional structure, communities can 
collective reach their own decisions on how to solve their problems and hopefully, in the 
process, generate stronger civic ties between its residents.  We may not know exactly what legal 
shape an immigrant city would need to take in order to better serve national and local interests 
with respect to immigration.  But we can and should begin the process of orienting the debate in 
such a manner so as to allow for such reform to take place.   
1. Addressing the Immigrant City as a Threat to Immigrants: Severing the 
Relationship between National and Local Membership  
 
Normative and legal principles of equal protection and immigrant rights have gone a long way in 
protecting immigrant residents from the sometimes oppressive inclinations of local governments.  
But a more long-term and effective way to address our fears about immigrant cities being a threat 
to immigrants might require us to adopt broader institutional reforms at the local level that folds 
immigrant residents into the local political community irrespective of national citizenship.  In 
addition, as Bainer Baubock explains, “[n]ew forms of urban citizenship might promote a 
cosmopolitan transformation of national conceptions of membership from below and from 
within.”255 Thus, broader efforts should be made to sever the connection between national and 
local membership generally, and permit noncitizen immigrants the ability to vote and participate 
in local elections specifically.256 
On the one hand, fostering such a conceptualization of local membership serves pragmatic 
functions with respect to the effective and efficient operations of local governance.  Already, the 
 
255 Rainer Baubock, Reinventing Urban Citizenship, 7 Citizenship Studies 139, 142 (2003). 
256 To be sure, alien suffrage, especially at the local level, is not a unique or novel proposition.  See Gerald 
Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants, Borders, and Fundamental Laws 64 – 66 (1996); Raskin, 
supra note 116, at 1403 (“Although aliens . . . voted feely in state, federal and territorial elections in many places, 
their participation in local government was even more common.”).   
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concentration of immigrant noncitizens in many communities is beginning to approach numbers 
that just cannot be ignored.257 As the franchise is the primary mechanism by which the interests 
and needs of municipal residents are conveyed to local leaders, and, in turn, channeled to state 
and federal authorities, ignoring the political concerns of noncitizen immigrants at the local level 
does a disservices to the effectiveness of representative democracy.   
 
On the other hand, local citizenship manifested through local franchises also serve an important 
symbolic function:  “immigrants . . . would be made aware that they are now full members of the 
polity and are also expected to use their rights of participation; the native population would be 
made aware that they share a common membership in the city with the immigrant population; 
and the city would formally assert its distinct character as a local polity vis-à-vis the national 
government.”  That such an effect may be labeled as symbolic does not mean that it is 
insignificant.  Local citizenship could serve as a fertile ground for training immigrants to become 
future citizens by participating in local politics and, in doing so, bolstering their civic identity 
and loyalty to America’s democratic foundations.  Because “the process of becoming a citizen 
[in the United States] emphasizes a (necessary) legal formalism, [and] not socialization into the 
means and meanings of active citizenry in a democratic society,”258 experience with the 
democratic process in this manner could be an invaluable civic education tool.  Immigrant 
participation could also temper exclusionary tendencies at the local level by channeling concerns 
from both sides into the public realm.   
 
But why should we believe that adopting a broader conceptualization of local citizenship would 
necessarily protect immigrants much more effectively than federal efforts?  First, history has 
shown that local political power has done more to protect immigrants from oppression and 
promote their involvement in American politics than protections instituted at the federal level.  It 
is no coincidence that the vast majority of the cases in which the courts have stepped in to protect 
immigrants either occurred before a particular immigrant population was able to gain a 
significant foothold in local politics (the European immigrants in New York and Boston), or 
because federal restrictions on naturalization and the convergence of national and local 
citizenship prevented other groups from participating in the local political process at all (the 
Chinese and the Japanese on the West Coast).  Moreover, local political participation promotes 
assimilation of immigrant groups in ways that assimilation mandates do not.  Public sector jobs 
have historically allowed many immigrant (and minority) groups to secure a solid economic 
foothold in American society.259 Moreover, experience with politics at the local level has also 
given many immigrant groups a conveyer belt to higher levels of government.260 
257 For example, a recent study found that nearly one-fifth of California’s adult population are noncitizens and that 
they form a majority in 12 cities and constitute more than a quarter of the population in 73 others.  See Joaquin 
Avila, Political Apartheid in California: Consequences of Excluding a Growing Noncitizen Population, Latino 
Policy and Issues Brief no. 9 (UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center), Dec. 2003, at 2; see also Keyssar, supra
note 154, at 309 (“Felons may have been the largest single group of disenfranchised citizens, but aliens by far were 
the largest group of adults barred from participation in American politics.”).   
258 Xavier de Souza Briggs, Civilization in Color: The Multicultural City in Three Millennia, 3 City and 
Community 311, 332 (2004). 
259 See Roger Waldinger, Still the Promised City? __ (1996). 
260 See e.g., Alejadro Portes & Ruben G. Rumbaut, Immigrant America: A Portrait 141 (“Before Irish, Italian, 
or Greek politicians entered the mainstream as interpreters of national values and aspirations, their predecessors 
spent much time in ward politics fighting for their own group’s interests.”).   
Draft: September 4, 2006 
 
56
Second, it is not clear that immigrants’ “virtual representation” at the federal level through the 
foreign affairs establishment accurately reflects their interests.261 On the one hand, such 
representation will likely offer very little protection for immigrants whose country-of-origin is 
not on good terms with America.  Indeed, with regard to immigrants from countries in the 
middle-east, the foreign affairs establishment has probably has done more to marginalize these 
groups than protect them.  On the other hand, the interests that foreign nations voice in 
Washington will likely diverge to some degree from those of the immigrants themselves. 262 
Because immigration provides important economic benefits to sending countries, those countries 
may tolerate or even promote certain exclusionary activities in order to ensure that immigrants 
maintain loyalties to their country-of-origin or encourage their eventual return.263 
In short, with the proper institutional reforms, local communities may serve as a better “direct” 
representative of immigrant interests than the nation as a whole.  Moreover, the decentralization 
of local governments ensures that the diversity of immigrant groups and local community needs 
are properly reflected.   
2. Addressing the Immigrant City as a Threat to the Nation or the States: 
Reconsidering National Interests and Finding a Local Role 
 
Severing national and local membership may temper the inclination of local governments to 
discriminate against its immigrant residents, but it also exacerbates fears of immigrant cities 
becoming political bastions of immigrant power.  But we need not believe that local involvement 
in the immigration project always poses a threat to national objectives.   
 
On the one hand, it is possible that when federal interests are considered from a local 
perspective, we will reach a different consensus on what kind of federal interests we wish 
promote.  Consider the increasing appeal of skill- or need-based immigration tied to labor sectors 
or employers that have particular needs that are unmet by the native labor force.264 In the 
national forum, where business and industry lobbies have the loudest voice, such a policy 
appears to be the best way to promote American interests.  From a local perspective, however, it 
is not clear that the economic benefits of immigration lie solely in filling the gaps in existing 
industries.  Historically, immigration has also led to the creation and proliferation of 
unanticipated industries and services that reinvigorate local economies, and in the aggregate, 
provide substantial contributions to the national economy and expand our global economic reach.  
 
261 See Neuman, supra note 93, at 1436–37.  
262 For a summary of the complexities of sending country’s view of their diasporas, see Yossi Shain, The Mexican 
American Diaspora’s Impact on Mexico, 114 Pol. Sci. Q. 661, 662 – 69 (1999).  
263 See id. at 674 (noting that although the Mexican consulate lobbied on behalf of Mexican immigrants in America, 
it also “collaborat[ed] with the United States in the repatriations of its kindred communities when it served its 
needs”) 
264 See, e.g. Andorra Bruno, Immigration: Policy Considerations Related to guest Worker Programs, Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress, April 6, 2006, at 28 (describing the Bush Administration proposal “to match 
willing foreign workers with willing U.S. employers”).  Indeed, even the current process for employment-based 
immigration, which many feel should be expanded, depends significantly on immigrants being able to secure an 
employer-sponsor or demonstrate that they intend to work in an existing domestic industry that is experiencing a 
shortage.  See Immigration and Naturalization Act § 203(b). 
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Thus, expanding the scope with which we ordinarily use to judge immigration to include local 
developments on the ground may influence how we define what kind of immigration is in fact in 
the best interests of this nation.  
 
On the other hand, local participation in the immigration project could transform elusive federal 
interests into tangible objectives.  In other words, political decentralization need not be 
something that we fear with regard to immigration.  Structured in the correct manner, it can have 
a profound impact in filling in many of the gaps that centralized, federal regulations have not 
adequately addressed.   
 
For example, although most would agree that immigrant assimilation is just as important of a 
federal interest as immigration enforcement, very few policies have been crafted to serve the 
former.  Nevertheless, local governments can be an important tool in this regard.  First, 
recognizing the immigrant city as a partner in the immigration project could counsel in favor of 
giving certain local communities more power and incentives to structure their land-use and 
housing policies to account for their role as immigrant receiving centers.  Cities can be 
empowered to either acquire property to build affordable housing options tailored to the needs of 
newly-arrived immigrants,265 or encourage the development of the same through inclusive 
zoning regulations.  In order to accommodate many of the lone sojourners that come to work, 
cities could develop or promote smaller housing units with communal shared spaces.  Similarly, 
to meet the needs of extended families of immigrants who band together for social and financial 
support, cities may wish to promote living facilities that provide more segmented living quarters 
and amenities for multi-generational residency.266 Indeed, depending on present needs, 
anticipated demands, or other normative consideration, a local community can vary this efforts in 
a number of ways: housing can built specifically for immigrants or provided for a diverse range 
of municipal residents; they can be provided as permanent dwellings for several years or as 
temporary housing units aimed at accommodating recently-arrived immigrants for a short period 
of time; and they could be organized to be self-sustaining or could be offered as a subsidized 
service in hopes of offsetting social service costs down the road that affordable housing in the 
early years might alleviate.   
 
Second, just as municipal-supported affordable housing can be used to help immigrants settle in 
America by providing residential options that meet their specific needs, cities may also wish to 
develop dedicated welcoming centers to help immigrant learn and adjust to American society.  
During the first wave of immigration to the United States, receiving centers such as New York’s 
Castle Gardens and its federal successor, Ellis Island, served as facilities where immigrants were 
not only inspected, but also provided with a wealth of information and services to facilitate their 
 
265 See Wilcox, supra note 150, at 95 (noting that although cities like New York has established departments to 
“inspect tenements and enforce the laws governing their construction and management . . .  no American city has 
gone so far as to copy the British cities in establishing municipal model tenement-houses.”).  Studies have 
demonstrated that immigrants in cities with large amounts of government sponsored social housing are less 
segregated and have more interactions with natives than those who reside in cities with largely private housing and 
few social housing options.  See Christian Kesteloot Cees Cortie, Housing Turks and Moroccans in Brussels and 
Amsterdam: The Difference between Private and Public Markets, 35 Urban Studies 1835, 1850 - 51 (1998). 
266 See Alvin James, Demographic Shifts and the Challenge for Planners, in Urban Planning in the Multicultural 
Society 15, 33 (Michael A. Burayidi ed., 2000).   
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settlement.267 Although for the vast majority of immigrants today the journey to American no 
longer involves sailing past the Statute of Liberty and into New York harbor, many distinct cities 
still serve as important points of entry for newly-arrived immigrants.  Cities in these positions 
could therefore (re)establish formal receiving centers to assist in local resettlement efforts: 
immigrants can receive information about available job prospects, learn how to apply for driver’s 
licenses and other registrations, be provided with assistance regarding naturalization and their 
legal rights in this country,268 find out about housing and transportation options, or even enroll in 
English language or job training course.  To be sure, some cities and non-profit organizations 
have already taken the initiative to offer some of these services.  A centralized location, however, 
can effectively provide a number of immigrant-related services from several different 
governmental and non-profit organizations while encouraging these organizations to cooperate in 
more efficient ways to streamline their operations.   
 
Providing welcoming facilities or similar services at the local level could also be used to better 
disperse the immigrant population into different parts of the country.  While many popular 
immigrant destinations complain about the disproportionate burden they shoulder with regard to 
immigrant needs, others, such as the cities of Baltimore, Philadelphia, Pittsburg, and Louisville 
have started to look into actively recruiting immigrants into their community.269 Considering the 
large numbers of immigrants already arriving into established gateway communities, 
collaborating with municipal receiving centers in these areas to provide information about and 
advertise specific resettlement programs offered by these recruiting communities may actually be 
a more effective and efficient means of attracting immigrants.  Informal information exchanges 
among co-ethnic networks already play a large part in guiding residential decisions among 
immigrant populations — sometimes leading to massive resettlement.270 Formalizing the 
process through a collaborative inter-local effort would better channel such movements to serve 
the interests of immigrants and communities across the country.  To be sure, local governments 
in traditional gateway cities may be concerned about expending valuable local resources to train, 
educate, and assimilate immigrants that will eventually leave for other communities.271 There is 
no reason to believe, however, that implementing a successful local settlement program 
combined with an active national resettlement effort would not lead to greater cross regional 
 
267 See supra note 81.  Other immigrant-receiving cities had similar facilities as well.  See e.g., First Annual Report, 
Massachusetts Bureau of Immigration, Massachusetts Public Documents No. 121 (1919), reprinted in Edith Abbott, 
Immigration: Selected Documents and Case Records 580, 580 – 587 (1924) (describing Massachusetts’ Bureau 
of Immigration, which established offices in Boston with branch offices in New Bedford and Springfield to assist 
immigrants with advise, information, and to combat fraud and handle wage claims).   
268 This may be especially important in light of the alarming rate of fraudulent legal services being pandered to legal 
and illegal immigrants.  See Gary Rivlin, Dollars and Dreams: Immigrants as Prey, N.Y. Times, June 11, 2006, at 
Section 3, p. 1.   
269 See Bill Ong Hing, Answering Challenges to the New Immigrant-Driven Diversity, 40 Brandeis L.J. 861, 869 - 
74 (2002). 
270 See Susan Taylor Martin, A Collision of Cultures Leads to Building Bridges in Maine: Somali Immigrants are 
Finding a Haven in a Previously Homogenous Enclave of Maine, St Petersburg Times, Mar. 13, 2005, at A1.   
271 See Lovelace, et al. Immigration and its Impact on American Cities 144 (1996) (“As . . . immigrants become 
established economically and socially, they move to other, more prosperous jurisdictions and are replaced by a new 
set of arriving immigrants.  Therefore, the jurisdictions with a disproportionate share of new immigrants bear the 
initial socialization and conditioning costs without the benefit of subsequent increasing revenue and community 
development.”).   
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cooperation among various communities across the country that would also produce additional 
means of financing these programs.272 
These two proposals offer some immediate possibilities that can be effectuated largely within the 
current structure of local government laws.  But if the federal government is serious about its 
effort to integrate immigrants into American society and ensure that they, along with their 
children, make long-lasting contributions to our nation, then the immigration debates must also 
be attuned to how the existing structure of local government laws organize our local 
communities.  As I explained above, existing local government policies have a tremendous 
impact on our country’s ability to bring immigrants into the fold of mainstream America and 
promote acceptance and tolerance of their presence.  The fully benefits of immigration will never 
be truly realized if federal, state, and local governments do not take steps to dismantle the 
inequitable and segregated communities that plague our metropolitan regions.  In this and many 
other respects, local government law is not just a local issue — it should be considered a national 
one as well.  
 
Of course, neither a strong commitment to community building, nor any of the proposals 
outlined above, will guarantee the disintegration of immigrant enclaves or complete and total 
dissolution of recent immigrants and their children into “mainstream” (i.e. middle-class Anglo) 
American society.  But ultimately, this may not be something that we want.  We should certainly 
take steps to dismantle the legal and social forces that artificially limit the residential options of 
immigrant families along the lines of race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, or alienage.  But we 
need not believe that replacing one form of uniformity (e.g. white suburbs, ethnic inner-cities) 
with another (perfect demographic distribution across the entire region) is the best possible 
outcome.273 What makes city-life, if not life in American society as a whole, interesting and 
exciting is the fact that there are physical spaces in which neighborhoods of character can arise.  
Moreover, without artificial legal impediments to residential mobility or the building of a 
cohesive political community, we would likely see more people of all walks of life being able to 
live in and enjoy these distinct communities instead of feeling that eradicating them would be the 
only way to prevent widespread balkanization and ethnic separatism.   
 
3. Addressing the Immigrant City as a Victim of Immigration: Facilitating Local 
Development and Promoting Global Competitiveness 
 
Last, local communities need not refrain from being actively involved in the broader immigration 
project because they believe themselves to be the ultimate victim of immigration and 
immigration policy generally.  Instead of focusing on accounting techniques that discount the 
benefits of immigration and construes local services as private commodities that are “purchased” 
by immigrants through their tax contributions, steps should be taken to address the local funding 
 
272 This type of cooperation is not without historical precedence.  See To Distribute Immigrants: Nine Governors and 
Many Mayors in League to Care for Newcomers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1912, at 9; Our Doors are Open, supra note 
83 (describing southern convention in which state and local leaders agreed to contribute to the establishment of an 
office in New York City to attract immigrants to the south).   
273 See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1841, 1913 – 15 (1994).   
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system as a whole.  Indeed, we should acknowledge that the beneficiaries of these services as not 
limited to the immigrant who receive them: proactive and preventative medical assistance to 
immigrants or their children has health and fiscal benefits for the entire community as a whole, 
and funding education for first and second generation immigrants, as opposed to being a windfall 
for their parents, are the means by which we determine how much they will be able to contribute 
to American society in the future.   
 
Similarly, local communities need not be paralyzed by the demographic challenges brought 
about by immigration, especially when local governments can take affirmative steps to promote 
positive developments.  This effort can be largely local in scope.  For example, cities could work 
with immigrant entrepreneurs to encourage businesses in distressed neighborhoods.  This would 
help many immigrants to achieve an economic foothold in American society while channeling 
the positive effects of immigration to neighborhoods that are in need of economic revitalization.  
Local communities can also promote immigrant entrepreneurship by providing training, financial 
services, and other incentives.  This could be a good alternative to the raze-and-reconstruct 
techniques employed in urban renewal movement of the mid-1990s by providing for necessary 
redevelopment while also promoting communities of character that may become a strong cultural 
asset for the city.  Vibrant commercial and residential neighborhoods not only reduce many of 
the ills associated with economic and social isolation, but it also cultivates a culture of 
investment by local residents and business owners.   
 
Local governments can also formulate ways to regulate or formalize labor markets in which 
immigrants are disproportionately represented to ensure that employers comply with labor and 
wage requirements and minimize any effect that immigrant labor may have on the wages of other 
disadvantaged groups.  For instance, local communities may be encouraged to either 
independently, or with the assistance of private or charitable groups,274 establish formal hiring 
centers for day-laborers.275 Day-laborer hiring centers would not only alleviate local opposition 
to immigrant workers by reducing their presence on street corners and other public and semi-
public locations, such centers can also establish efficient and uniform requirements regarding 
how workers are assigned, minimum wages for different types of tasks, and working conditions 
at job sites.  In a largely non-unionized sector of the job market, day-laborer centers can facilitate 
the type of collective action necessary to keep wages from plummeting and ensure safe working 
conditions.  Moreover, there is no reason to believe that day-laborer centers would serve to only 
help the immigrant population in a given community.  Regulated centers could also provide 
another form of employment for low-skilled native workers who have difficulties finding full-
time employment.  A formalized structure for dispersing such work could reduce employer 
reliance on co-ethnic referrals and give opportunities to other local residents as well.   
 
274 See Richard Simon, Day Labor Site Mandate Riles D.C., L.A. Times, Apr. 23, 2006, at 8 (describing cities that 
have conditioned the construction of home improvement stores on the store’s willingness to construct and operate 
day-laborer centers and a proposal in Congress to forbid such requirements); Christina Bellantoni, Fairfax County, 
Va., Day-Laborer Center at Issue, Wash. Times, Aug. 22, 2005, at __ (describing a proposed day-laborer center to 
be funded by the county and managed by “Project Hope and Harmony, a group of churches and community 
leaders”). 
275 This would require some states to repeal or amend current laws.  See, e.g., Arizona HB 2592 (2005) (Prohibiting 
cities, towns, and counties from constructing or maintaining day-laborer centers if any part facilitates the hiring of 
undocumented immigrants).   
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At the same time, embracing the benefits of immigration may require immigrant cities to adopt a 
more transnational outlook.  As America becomes increasingly entrenched in a globalized 
network of economic, political, and cultural relationships, the immigrant city is also extending 
outwards: it is progressively being thought of as vital nodes of connection between the United 
States and the world.  Indeed, if the focus of the first two alternatives of the immigrant city 
emphasizes its capacity of the local to serve as a representative of the nation in bringing 
immigrants into America’s social, economic, and cultural mainstream, in a world of increased 
transnational connectivity, might we also see the immigrant city as a representative of the United 
States to the world, with the immigrant acting as a vital link in the process.   
 
If certain cities may wish to develop in the direction of being a global city, how could the legal 
presumptions about the goals of our immigration project or the role that local government play 
be altered to accommodate these interests?  For one, it may be necessary to further decentralize 
power over immigrant education to local authorities.  Cities seeking to become world or global 
cities may have educational priorities different from that of the state or the nation for their 
immigrant and native residents.  Indeed, notwithstanding the national and state trends favoring 
rapid and uniform linguistic assimilation through policies designed to enshrine English as the 
“official” language, aspiring global cities like the City of Miami are already deviating somewhat 
by upholding the Spanish proficiency of its immigrant population in support of claim as the 
“Gateway to Latin America.”276 Instead of fostering state or national English Only initiatives 
that threaten to foreclose local discretion with regard to local language education, cities like 
Miami should be given the leeway to adopt educational programs that promote true bilingualism 
— not only for the second and third generation Hispanic immigrants, but also native-born whites 
and blacks as well — to better prepare its residents to participate in Miami’s unique economic 
climate.277 
A shift toward seeing immigrant cities as embedded in the transnational marketplace may also 
spur cities to participate more fully in the development of local economic policies with an eye to 
reducing local inequalities.  The economic expansion based on manufacturing and other 
unionized labor during the early to mid-twentieth century is believed to have helped create a 
sizable middle-class.  But, at the same time, it also led to the suburban exodus of many 
metropolitan residents at the expense of the inner-city.  The new urban economy has propelled 
many residents and businesses to relocate back into the central cities.  But its emphasis on 
financial services and high-technology has lead to increased socioeconomic inequalities and a 
deepening divide between the rich and the working poor.278 To be sure, local governments 
would likely tread lightly with regard to local inequalities lest they lose their competitive edge to 
competing cities in America and around the world.  Nevertheless, as a political institution with 
jurisdiction over these vital nodes of global trade, local governments in global cities are also in a 
 
276 Florida FTAA, Miami’s bid proposal to host the Free Trade Areas of the Americas (FTAA) Permanent 
Secretariat, at 5 – 6, available at http://www.floridaftaa.org/web/official/english/index.html. 
277 See generally Creating Florida's Multilingual Global Workforce: Educational Political Practices for Students 
Learning English as a New Language (Sandra H. Fradd et al., eds. 1998), available at
http://www.ncela.gwu.edu/pubs/florida/workforce99/index.htm.  There are already indications that Miami is starting 
to promote bilingualism more broadly among its student population.  See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language and 
Participation, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 687, 765 (2006).  
278 See Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy 117 (2d ed. 2000).   
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good position to channel much of the surplus capital generated within its jurisdiction toward 
progressive programs aimed at raising the standard of living for all its residents.279 
In the end, it may be that the increasing interdependence and interrelationship between global 
cities across the world could counsel in favor of devolving some control over immigration 
inflows from the federal government down to the local level altogether.  As cities are beginning 
to play a larger role in the global marketplace, they are already beginning to take informal 
stances on issues relating to immigration and foreign affairs, including strengthening their 
independent relationship with cities across the world.280 It is possible to imagine a time when it 
may be deemed appropriate to exempt cities from the national monopoly on issues such as 
immigration altogether.  There is no reason to believe that the interests of global cities will 
always or necessarily coincide with those of the nation as a whole.  Moreover, as Baubock 
argues, such liberation may be especially beneficial to cities that are already linked with 
transnational counterparts in other countries: “Instead of being confined within sovereign states 
where they merely form the smallest self-governing territorial units, city polities would in this 
way be connected to each other in transnational relations.”281 Of course, I offer this last proposal 
tentatively; it certainly introduces a lot of complications — from broad normative concerns about 
national unity to pragmatic considerations such as how to control the inflows of immigrant into 
one community from moving to other communities that seeks to restrict immigration — at the 
same time that it promises a more flexible system of immigration that takes into account local 
needs and interests.     
Conclusion 
The fate of American society is too intricately tied to the health and vitality of our cities for us to 
continue to disregard the role of local governments in this nation’s immigration project.  The 
intersection between immigration and local government law is too entrenched in the doctrinal 
framework for us to continue to ignore the mutual impact of these two bodies of law upon one 
another.  As this article has demonstrated, the current state of the immigrant city simply cannot 
be dismissed as an inevitable consequence of social and economic forces outside of our control.  
Nor should we persist in writing off the legal space within which it stands — at the legal juncture 
of immigration and local government law — as an unintended doctrinal anomaly.  As a 
significant geo-social institution in our lives and a vital ideological component of our national 
narrative, we must begin to understand and study the immigrant city as a legal concept.  We can 
maintain the immigrant city as it stands now by continuing the legal foundation upon which it 
rests.  But as a product of our legal structure, we are also free to transform it to serve different 
purposes and, ultimately, to pursue different normative objectives.  The immigrant city can be a 
 
279 Cf. David Barron, Boxed Out: Big-Box Retailers Like Wal-mart are Looking to Expand into Urban Markets,
Boston Globe, August 13, 2006, at D1 (describing the City of Chicago’s efforts to regulate employee benefits of 
big-box retailers as evidence that cities “emerg[ing] from decades of decline with newfound financial strength . . . 
are now beginning to assert their public powers to decide the kind of cities they want to be”). 
280 See Gerald E. Frug & David Barron, International Local Government Law, at _ (forthcoming); Baubock, 
Reinventing Urban Citizenship, supra note 255, at 139, 149; see also Smith, supra note 7, at 185 – 86, 189 - 91 
(describing how local American and foreign leaders are campaigning in other countries to appeal to the transnational 
residents within their community).   
281 See Baubock, supra note 255, at 149. 
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valuable tool in the national immigration project, if only we are willing to accept it as such and 
legally shape it to advance certain normative goals as opposed to others.   
 
It is admittedly far too early to predict exactly what shape an alternative model of the immigrant 
city might take or what solutions or problems such an alternative model might bring.  What is 
becoming more evident, however, is that the current models of the immigrant city are too 
limited, even in their varied forms, to serve the national immigration interests or the local 
interests with regard to immigrant incorporation into our local communities.  We should 
certainly proceed with caution in exploring ways to reform the existing legal structure as it 
pertains to the role of local governments in the immigration debates.  But lest we lose sight of the 
fact that the current models of the immigrant city have hardly arisen through conscious 
deliberation, we should seize this opportunity to explore the myriad possibilities that the 
immigrant city might hold.    
 
